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ABSTRACT 
Within the last few years, Europe has witnessed several major disruptions 
in its supply of Russian energy.  The recent “gas wars” between Russia and 
Ukraine in early 2006, as well as the disruption of gas transiting Belarus in 
January 2007, posed serious implications for an already energy-deprived 
Europe.  Russia’s aging infrastructure, infamously inefficient domestic 
consumption, and current state of affairs, raises considerable doubts over its 
ability to supply consistent levels of energy to downstream markets.  
Consequently, can Europe truly depend upon Russia to supply energy when and 
where they promise?  Despite President Vladimir Putin’s claims to the contrary, 
Moscow uses energy as an instrument of national power, to influence, dictate 
and enforce its foreign policy with regards to the rest of the world.  Russia’s vast 
untapped resources are huge, and if harvested correctly could help to provide 
stability in a world that is starving for energy.  Yet, Russia’s actions seem to 
indicate that it is not willing to permit market forces to dictate what it can supply 
or even when and to whom it will supply energy.  Nevertheless, energy security is 
and will continue to be, a primary factor in relationships between Europe, Russia 
and the rest of the world. 
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I. THE ENERGY SECURITY DEBATE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
One does not have to look far to know that the world is facing a severe 
energy crisis.  Actuality, all it takes is a quick trip to the corner gas station or a 
look at a household’s latest energy bill.  The world is actually facing two energy 
crises, but no real answers.  The first involves scarcity and traditional power 
politics, and the second is driven by climate changes.  Since the debate about 
global warming is controversial at best, debate on climate change will be 
considered only in relation to the fact that there is an ever-increasing demand to 
develop alternative “clean” energy sources to reduce the dependence upon oil 
and gas.  In theory, both of the energy crises could direct efforts in the same 
direction.  The development of alternative energy sources would definitely reduce 
the dependence on oil and gas.  Since alternative energy sources are years 
away, the search for new sources of oil and gas will continue to be the central 
theme driving the foreign policies of all the world's greatest powers, especially in 
Europe and Russia.  
Within the last few years, Europe has witnessed several major disruptions 
in its supply of Russian energy.  The recent “gas wars” between Russia and the 
Ukraine in early 2006, as well as the disruption of gas transiting Belarus in 
January 2007, posed serious implications for an already energy-deprived 
Europe.  Additional fears have risen in Europe about Russia’s intentions, since 
both countries have been threatened with further cuts if their large gas debts are 
not paid, with the latest threat coming as recently as the first week of October 
2007.  Additionally, there have been countless incidents that, in one way or 
another, have resulted in supply-system degradation.  These incidents range in 
severity from benign equipment malfunctions and accidents to deliberate acts of 
sabotage.  One example is the terror acts of January 22, 2006, in North Ossetia, 
Russia that disrupted gas exports for two days.  Another is the huge explosion, in 
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March 2007, which claimed over one hundred lives and was the deadliest of the 
five major coal (Although coal is not a major export at this time, it is heavily used 
for energy inside Russia) accidents to plague Russia over the past decade. The 
nuclear industry, which supplies large quantities of power, is yet another example 
of Russian energy instability, one that is still scarred by the infamous Chernobyl 
disaster.  Despite all of these incidents, Russia still remains one of Europe’s, and 
even the world’s, most crucial suppliers of energy.   
Unfortunately, the current state of Russian affairs has raised considerable 
concern over the questionable reliability of Russia as an energy supplier.  With its 
aging infrastructure and infamously inefficient domestic consumption, Russia 
occasionally raises doubts over its ability to supply consistent levels of energy to 
downstream markets.  Consequently, with how much certainty can Europe 
depend upon Russia to supply energy when and where they promise?  Another 
factor of Russian reliability, which must be taken into account is that, regardless 
of President Vladimir Putin’s claims to the contrary, Moscow uses its current 
energy policies, as an instrument of national power, to influence, dictate and at 
times enforce its foreign policy with regard to the rest of the world, particularly 
Europe.   
This thesis addresses the possible motivations behind Russia’s current 
energy policies regarding Europe, while at the same time specifically trying to 
determine what other options remain for Europeans to safeguard their own 
energy security, with or without Russia.  Considering all the theories involved in 
analyzing Russian statecraft, Adam Stulberg’s synopsis provides the best insight 
into realist and liberal theories of power politics.   
Scholars of realist and liberal theories advance contending 
propositions about the success of statecraft, generating 
expectations that Russia’s energy leverage would be either 
awesome or ineffectual, respectively.  Russia’s record of coercion 
was both more effective than expected by integrationists and less 
potent than predicted by realists.  Counter to integrationist 
expectations, Russia adroitly seized on the trade of natural gas to 
wrangle concessions from potential competitors.  Yet Moscow 
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flaunted realist predictions by failing miserably to capitalize on its 
power advantages and petroleum pipelines to coerce similar 
concessions.1 
Stulberg’s theory refocuses the discussion back to the magnitude that Russia’s 
strategic leverage has over Europe.  The answers to which are the keys in 
solving the energy security dilemma currently faced by not only Russia, but 
Europe as well.   
Along with the standing theories defining the problem, there are also 
several leading schools of thought concerning the solution to Europe’s collective 
dilemma, but three main ideas for resolving the situation have risen to the 
forefront.  First is an EU centric approach, which asks for all European countries 
to join together now while planning ways of reducing dependence on Russia in 
the future.  This has several advantages, but “Unfortunately, the EU is currently 
in the middle of a relapse into economic patriotism.”2  The second is a go-it-alone 
attitude favored by the Russians.  Due to the inability of the EU to establish a 
common energy policy, Russia has free reign to bully the individual members of 
the EU because it “views its energy resources as a valuable foreign policy tool 
and prefers to get its way through selective bilateral arrangements.”3  The best 
example of this is the Baltic pipeline, discussed in much greater detail later,  
which is a joint venture between Germany’s BASF and Gazprom.  The final 
approach is one supported by the United States.  It seeks to limit the influence 
Russia aspires to “project internationally via its energy exports.  It also 
encourages Moscow to open up its natural resources and make them conducive 
to investment by trans-national corporations.”4  This approach is problematic 
                                            
1 Adam N. Stulberg, Well-Oiled Diplomacy: Strategic Manipulation and Russia’s Energy 
Statecraft in Eurasia (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2007), 5-6. 
2 Wolfgang Munchau, “Europe needs a joint response to Russia,” Financial Times, May 8, 
2006, 17. 
3 EIU ViewsWire, “EU Economy: Energy relations with Russia,” New York: October 18, 2006. 
4 “Russia/US/EU: Security thinking fuels energy dilemma,” OxResearch (September 21, 
2006), http://proquest.umi.com.libproxy.mps.navy.mil/ (accessed January 23, 2007). 
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because it favors U.S. companies while at the same time touches on the taboo of 
foreign direct investment (FDI) of which Russia is extremely resistant. 
 
B. ENERGY BACKGROUND IN EUROPE 
Although the Europeans are energy deprived, options still remain in which 
to secure their energy needs without establishing a joint foreign energy policy.    
There is some power within the framework of the TransEuropean 
Networks policy to assist financially the setting up of major transit 
and import facilities that contribute to greater diversification, 
otherwise it acts by exerting influence on the institutions of other 
countries.  The EU is also trying to promote a joint regulatory 
space.5   
At the same time, there would be some added strength in a treaty that the EU 
was able to ratify.  The Energy Charter Treaty (ECT), also known as the 
European Energy Charter, plays a crucial role as part of an “international effort to 
build a legal foundation for energy security, based on the principles of open, 
competitive markets and sustainable development.”6  Two of the more 
substantial parts of the charter include trade/transit issues and energy efficiency.  
Considering that the EU has no internal borders, the trade and transit aspect of 
the treaty follows in line by covering “the entire energy chain from production and 
generation to the terms under which energy can be traded and transported.”7  
This chain not only includes various national jurisdictions but also international 
markets.  Trade could also become a factor if a secondary market for excess 
energy is developed.  Concerning energy efficiency, it is simply a calculation of 
how much energy a country consumes based on gross domestic product.  
Technology has developed scores of items that uses less energy, particularly in 
                                            
5 Dominique Finon and Catherine Locatelli, “Russian and European gas interdependence: 
Can market forces balance out geopolitics?”  Cahier de Recherché Lepii, Serie EPE, No 41 bis 
(January 2007), 6. 
6 Energy Charter, “About the Charter,” www.encharter.org (accessed March 20, 2007). 
7 Energy Charter, “Trade and Transit,” www.encharter.org (accessed March 20, 2007). 
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the area of building construction, which in turn would also provide a means of 
creating additional supplies since less is consumed.     
However, serious challenges still plague the Europeans.  Even though the 
EU has been attempting to draw Russia into the multilateral energy framework of 
the ECT, the treaty is now fifteen years old.  It was “signed by 51 states and the 
EU, but Russia was one of only a few countries, and by far the most important, 
that has not ratified it.  Nor is it likely to do so in the future.”8  This is unfortunate 
because it offers not only legally binding rules covering access to pipelines and 
investments, but also provides for the arbitration of disputes.  Leaving only the 
economic approach to the situation unresolved. 
 
C. ENERGY BACKGROUND IN RUSSIA 
Russia currently has the eighth largest oil reserves in the world.  It is the 
largest non-OPEC producer of oil, ranking second behind Saudi Arabia in total 
production.  It makes up 12 percent of the global production and export of oil 
while at the same time controls the world’s largest proven gas reserves at 32 
percent.  Yet only three, predominantly state-owned, companies control 100 
percent of the country’s oil and Gazprom, another state-run company, controls 25 
percent of the world’s gas reserves.  In general, Russia does not look favorably 
upon direct foreign investment into its oil and gas industry.  Concurrently, 
Russians are generally leery of investing their scant savings.  The populations 
fears are twofold: not only do Russians lack faith in their own government to 
protect property rights, but due to experiences during the early 1990s many 
people distrust private enterprise as merely enriching disreputable oligarchs.  In 
turn, this leads to Russia’s largest problem concerning natural constraints of 
future demands, which is a shortage of infrastructure.  Currently, Russia has not 
invested in any additional exploration for new sources of oil or gas.  Russia also 
                                            
8 EUI ViewsWire. 
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has failed to invest in making its industries more efficient users of energy, a 
situation only exacerbated by the fact that Russia is one of the most inefficient 
users of energy in the world.  Thus as Russia grows so does its own energy 
needs, albeit at a disproportional rate.  If the state were to increase its own 
energy efficiency it could reduce energy needs, thereby freeing up additional 
supplies for the ever-increasing demand of foreign customers.  This increase in 
supply would greatly benefit Europe; however, unless things in the country 
drastically change, it would be quite difficult for Russia to actually accomplish. 
Most of the energy produced in, and exported from, Russia is controlled 
by the state and in turn has become the “‘biggest stick” behind Russian foreign 
policies.  The Russian government has the power to restrict both the export of 
Russian oil and gas as well as its production, but this is not the most 
disconcerting issue.  The most unnerving issue is that Russia is becoming 
increasingly more aggressive in its relations with other countries, they have 
started to use energy as a coercive tool to either deter or manipulate other 
countries policies, and they have started to use their newfound wealth to rebuild 
their massive military establishment.  All of these factors leave Europe in quite a 
predicament since many countries are dependent on Russia for not only their 
domestic energy needs, but also for a significant portion of their non-domestic 
international commitments.  
 
D. CONCERNS REGARDING PRICE AND SUPPLY 
When looking at simple supply and demand theory, price increases with 
demand as long as supply either stays constant or declines.  In turn, drastic price 
increases, as seen over the past year with regards to the price per barrel of oil, 
will lead to increases in both exploration and production as well as research and 
development of unconventional sources.  As a result, until production and 
exploration catch up to demand, those countries that have steady supplies are in 
a position to profit greatly.  In the longer term, what is most likely to happen is 
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that prices will drop just as they always have in the past.  Eventually, companies 
will hire more people and build its infrastructure in order to increase production, a 
situation that is currently happening.    
The industry is in the middle of a construction boom, with old 
facilities not used for decades being reopened.  Alternative sources 
of fuels including unconventional oil from regions such as Canada’s 
oil sands also become more attractive, as do biofuels.   Resource 
nationalism, too, has its cycle: countries that spurned foreign 
investment decide they need it to revive flagging production.9 
The best example of high prices making it profitable to explore can be found in 
the struggle to lay claim to the Arctic seabed.  Russia has recently placed a 
national flag on floor of the Arctic seabed in an attempt to claim that the North 
Pole is part of the Lomonosov Ridge, which is an extension of the Russian 
continental shelf, and therefore Russian territory.  Analysts say the huge cost of 
exploring the Arctic “will prevent the exploration of oil and gas reserves for 
several decades.  But oil majors are already positioning themselves for the 
race.”10 In particular state-backed Russian companies, already enriched with oil 
and gas revenues, are the primary backers of the high cost expedition.  However, 
all of this will take time and until market forces can balance supply and demand, 
there is plenty of opportunity for the oil and natural gas market to cause serious 
economic and social disruption.  
Since Europe is in serious need of energy, Russian has the advantage.  
“As a major supplier of natural gas to European countries, Russia has some 
ability to set prices.”11  As previously mentioned, Russia literally shut off the gas 
supply to Ukraine and Belarus and was considering shutting off supply to 
Russian Georgia, all because of a price dispute.  These countries as well as 
                                            
9 Ed Crooks, “Drip feed: Why high oil prices threaten to linger,” Financial Times, July 19, 
2007, 7. 
10 Isabel Gorst, “Russia raises stakes over Artic seabed,” Financial Times, August 2, 2007, 
3. 
11 Bernard A. Gelb, “Russian Natural Gas: Regional Dependence” (CRS Report for 
Congress, January 10, 2007), 2. 
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other governments probably believe that “Russia has little interest in market 
forces in the energy sector.  In this view, Russia wishes to preserve energy 
prices at a high level in order to maximize profits.”12  Although, Russia’s would 
argue that all of the former Soviet states, have been heavily subsidized and have 
been paying well under market price for gas and oil.  Others would also argue 
that Russia has been helping safeguard these newly independent states for the 
last two decades and it is about time that subsides end.  President Putin simply 
says, “We must not subsidize the economies of other countries in large amounts, 
comparable with their budgets.  No one else does that.”13  In time, it is expected 
that the Russians will push for market prices in all of their former states, as 
Belarus and Ukraine have recently discovered.  Despite the feelings in Europe as 
well as in the rest of the world, Russia’s actions are quite logical.  Most likely the 
Russian’s are using energy to help dictate foreign policy to get these countries to 
pay higher rates, even though it is still well under market price.  However, Russia 
could probably go about pursue higher rates in a better and much less political 
manner.     
Even though Russia is reaping the benefits of higher gas prices, they are 
most likely not that familiar with the many aspects of capitalism and the 
uniqueness of the energy market.   
Since energy consumption usually has a low elasticity to prices in 
the short term and because energy uses are the result of technical 
choices embedded in industrial processes, the notion of Energy 
Security is a dynamic and just not static one.14   
This also means that the Russians may not fully understand the impact that 
energy supply uncertainty has on economic and technical choices.  “As 
adaptation is slow and elasticity is low, price movements are able to induce cost 
                                            
12 Paul Gallis, “NATO and Energy Security,” (CRS Report for Congress,” Order Code 
RS22409, March 21, 2006), 3. 
13 Neil Buckley, “Putin considers creation of ‘gas Opec’ but denies plans for cartel,” Financial 
Times, February 2, 2007, 4. 
14 Jacques Sapir, “Energy Security in Russia: The case for Energy Efficiency” (Unpublished 
manuscript, EHESS-Paris), 2. 
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push inflation phenomena and can lead to severe wealth crunch.”15  In other 
words, if the Russians do not plan wisely and according to market forces, they 
may be severely crippled if the price of oil or natural gas were to suddenly dive.  
This very situation happened to the Soviets in the 1980s and the Russians 
around 1998.   
Since the price of energy can never be guaranteed from one day to the 
next, the only real planning that either the Russian’s or the Europeans can do is 
work toward guaranteeing supplies.  In a utopian world, the Russians and 
Europeans would work on a rational policy of energy security to  
try and make users more sensitive to changes in supply and prices.  
At the present, most consumers buy electricity at a fixed tariff, 
which means that if there is a shortage then the lights go off.  But if 
prices responded quickly to wholesale markets, people would be 
more likely to run off the light, making the whole system better able 
to compete.16   
Since “European governments view energy security issues primarily in an 
economic and political context,”17 the policy side of the debate cannot be 
overlooked and will be addressed in the following chapters. 
 
E. ECONOMIC THEORY AND THE ROAD AHEAD 
The views expressed in this thesis will be largely economic in nature and 
will focus on: (a) the various energy cost options facing the European countries, 
(b) the risks associated with alternative energy sources, (c) and the political risk 
these countries face in dealing with Russia. This thesis will continue by focusing 
on two case studies specifically looking at how energy security in two different 
countries might be applied to energy security for the rest of Europe.  The first 
                                            
15 Sapir, 2. 
16 “Energy giants do not mean energy security Europe has better ways to ensure gas and 
electricity supplies,” Financial Times, January 13, 2007, 8. 
17 Gallis, 2. 
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case study involves Germany.  Germany currently receives 70 percent of its 
energy imports from Russia and is by far the largest consumer of Russian energy 
in Europe.  The second case study involves Poland.  Poland only imports about 
30 percent of its energy from Russia, far less than some other countries but, as a 
country recently emerging from communist rule, poses a nice juxtaposition to 
compare to a long standing country like Germany.  Both of these case studies 
discuss the current situation, perceptions, the current policy debate, as well as 
identify policy options. 
The importance of this study is to illustrate how the European nations 
approach the increasingly pressing problem of achieving energy security. In 
order to do so it addresses several critical issues:  What factors come into play in 
formulating a national energy strategy? What time horizon is critical for national 
energy decisions? What roles are assigned to the private sector in assuring 
adequate energy supplies?  How do the European countries take their 
competitors actions into account?  Subsequently, are their  “competing energy 
trade policies responsible for the energy security dilemma that both Russia and 
the European Union are facing?”18  For purposes of this thesis, energy security is 
defined as:  
the ability to have at disposal energy in quantity and quality needed 
to cover the nation’s economic and social needs, including its 
international commitments.  What then matters is not only the fact 
that instant supply could be guaranteed, but that constant supply 
could be forecasted by potential users with a reasonable degree of 
certainty.19    
Also, there are two principal economic and political components of energy 
security.  First is the “set of all actions that affect the quantity and reliability of 
indigenous energy supplies.  The second includes actions taken affecting 
                                            
18 OxResearch, “Russia/US/EU.” 
19 Sapir, 2. 
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external energy supplies.”20  The two very closely linked together.  It is, therefore, 
the connection between having needed energy in the short term and having an 
assured energy supply over the long term that binds Europe to Russia.   
Energy supplies and prices are also major economic factors throughout 
the world.  Energy markets are usually very unpredictable and at time extremely 
volatile.    The ability to track changes in energy is also equally complicated due 
to variations in the energy markets themselves.    
These markets, for the most part, operate independently, although 
events in one may influence trends in another.  For instance, oil 
price movement can affect the price of natural gas, which then 
plays a significant role in the price of electricity.  As a result, 
aggregate indicators of total energy production and consumption do 
not adequately reflect these complexities. 21 
In theory, price increases in one could also transfer to other sectors that use 
different forms of energy, especially if the demand for the cheaper form becomes 
greater than anticipated supply.  Even though one form of energy is not easily 
substitutable for another there can be overlap effects into the other sectors.  
Since the indicators of total energy production and consumption are difficult to 
determine, discussions will be limited to the four main energy sectors.    
Primarily oil, particularly gasoline for transportation, and electricity 
generation and consumption.  Natural gas is also and important 
energy source, for home heating as well as in industry and 
electricity generation.  The last two are coal, which is used almost 
entirely for electricity generation, and nuclear, which is completely 
used for electricity generation.22          
As can be seen in Figure 1 below, wood and biomass were historically the 
predominant forms of energy, but coal overtook wood and biomass toward the 
beginning of the 20th century.  However, the last few decades of the last century 
                                            
20 David A. Deese, “Energy: Economics, Politics, and Security,” International Security, Vol. 4, 
No. 3 (Winter, 1979-1980), 140. 
21 Carol Glover and Carl E. Behrens, “Energy: Selected Facts and Numbers,” (CRS Report 
for Congress, July 24, 2007), 1. 
22 Ibid. 
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saw significant rises in the use of other fuels.  Petroleum quickly started 
becoming the largest source of the world’s energy after the Second World War.  
It rose from about 38 percent in 1950 to a high of approximately 45 percent in the 
mid-1970s and it has settled to about 40 percent of the world’s energy, which it is 
expected to hold to the latter half of this century.  At first, natural gas followed a 
similar patter to oil but, unlike oil, natural gas is expected to continue to grow at a 
moderate rate.  Currently natural gas makes up roughly 25 percent of the world’s 
energy and it is expected to overtake oil as the predominate energy sometime 
within the next 20 to 30 years and reach a high of approximately 30 percent 
sometime in the last couple of decades of this century. 
 
Figure 1.   The Future of Energy23 
                                            
23 World Energy Council, Google Energy Security Images, 
http://images.google.com/images?svnum=10&um=1&hl=en&q=energy+security (accessed 
November 9, 2007). 
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   As for nuclear, hydroelectric, and solar energy each has its own history, 
but every one of these energy sources is expected to provide between 10 and 20 
percent of the world’s energy by the year 2075, to include the previously 
mentioned coal industry.  Despite the fact that there are vast quantities of coal 
available, concerns for the environment have limited its use.  Nuclear power has 
greatly increased since its inception and it could end up providing more than the 
expected 20 percent of the world’s power; however, increases in capital costs to 
build new plants as well as public opposition to the potential dangers will 
probably limit its future potential as well.  As per Figure 1, solar and hydroelectric 
power are also seen but neither will be focused upon since in most every 
situation they are primarily used for internal domestic consumption.  Even though 
they are part of the energy equation and can generate energy, which can be sold 
on secondary markets, their impact on the overall world market is still relatively 
small.    
Another aspect of energy security is that once a party secures a supply of 
a particular form of energy (oil, natural gas, etc), it naturally follows that they 
become dependent on that form of energy because each requires a different 
infrastructure.  One of Russia’s greatest assets is that it can produce and supply 
energy in all its various forms but ironically that doesn’t allow for the flexibility one 
might assume. Actually if there are many potential energy sources, “there can’t 
be complete or fast substitution.  If nuclear power can be used for electric power 
generation, this is not a solution for car and truck engines.”24  This issue is not 
one sided; countries that import energy need to be secure in the fact that the 
energy will be available when they need it.  In turn, countries that produce energy 
need to be secure in that once energy has been produced there will be a stable 
market for its export.  A lack of either could significantly weaken the credibility of 
the defaulting party or hurt future relations between the two.  This may ultimately 
lead to a decline in the economic well being of the country.  Potential users would 
then be forced to try and to achieve substitution of “less uncertain energy 
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sources to more uncertain ones, even if these sources are economically 
inefficient or even destructive on the natural environment.”25  Daniel Yergin, the 
president of Cambridge Energy Research Associates and a specialist on energy 
and international politics, strategy, and economics describes the situation quite 
well. 
The world has changed much since the concept of energy security 
emerged in the 1970s.  But agreeing on its importance is not the 
same as agreeing on what it means.  Consuming countries declare 
that they want ‘security of supply’ – that is, reliability and availability 
of energy at reasonable prices.  Exporting countries, whether 
Russia or the Middle East, turn it around and talk about ‘security of 
demand’ – sufficient access to markets and consumers to justify 
future investment (and protect their national revenues).26  
This is why energy companies around the world are constantly speculating and 
investing in potential new sources of energy.  It must also be understood that 
without new sources of energy no one party will be able to adequately meet the 
needs of current projected growth.  While it may seem to be a marriage of 
convenience, “the overall EU-Russian energy relationship can be best explained 
through a framework of mutual interest and dependency.”27  In other words, 
Russia has become just as dependent on Europe to sell its energy, as Europe is 
to buy it.  Economically, they are bound together. 
In short, Russia’s current energy policies are influencing European 
decision-making concerning energy security.  Energy, or lack thereof, is of such 
importance that it reaches into all aspects of society to include financial, political, 
and sociological.   
Energy statecraft involves access to a resource, property rights, 
pipelines, investment capital, prices and tariffs that are extended to 
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deter, contain, or coerce a target.  These tools contrast with the 
value of military and diplomatic techniques that are generally 
stipulated in terms of violence, symbols, or negotiation.28   
This suggests that energy security is currently, and will continue to be, a primary 
factor in relationships between Europe, Russia and the rest of the world.  The 
vast resources that currently lie untapped in Russia is incredible and if harvested 
correctly could help to provide stability in a world that is starving for energy.  Yet, 
Russia’s current actions seem to indicate that it is not willing to permit market 
forces to dictate what it can supply or even when and to whom it will supply 
energy.  However, Russia’s antagonism is not new, and it needs to be careful in 
how it treats its customers.  Just because Russia has significant supplies of 
energy it does not mean it can dictate terms to others.   
Even though a hegemon may posses the world’s largest consumer 
market or be the world’s largest supplier of a particular set of 
goods, offering or denying access to these goods may have little 
effect on the behavior of foreign actors if alternate markets or 
suppliers can be found, and if the cost of shifting to the alternate 
source is lower than the costs of the sanctions.29 
As will be discussed later, Poland is a firm believer of this concept.  
Unfortunately, Russia is unable to fully see how this is relevant and only sees 
itself as a premier energy supplier and therefore worthy of respect.  it is simply 
just a factor of how Russia perceives the energy market and its place in the 
world.  The forthcoming review of Russia will shed some light into this mindset. 
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 Russia is “fabulously rich in resources, brimming with natural gas, oil, and 
vast quantities of timber, coal, and precious metals,”30 which makes the country’s 
energy background quite a bit different than Europe’s.   
Russia has a unique position on the Eurasian landmass and is the 
only country able to produce energy in all its different forms, from 
hydrocarbon-based fossil fuels to nuclear generated electric power.  
There is no doubt that Russia is to be a major partner for most 
European countries.31   
Russia has also shaken off its most recent recession of the late 1990s.  In 2006, 
Russia’s real gross domestic product was approximately $1.7 trillion (all sums 
are in U.S. dollars).  Internally, Russia is completely energy self-sufficient. It gets 
roughly half of its energy from natural gas, oil accounts for just under 20 percent, 
with the remainder of its energy needs (approximately 30 percent) coming from 
coal and nuclear power.  Russia’s economic growth since the end of its recession 
in 2000 can be attributed primarily by energy exports, “given the increase in 
Russian oil production and relatively high world oil prices during the period.”32  In 
turn this means that Russia’s economy is extremely dependent on oil and gas 
exports and is vulnerable to fluctuations in world energy prices or disruptions in 
demand.  Although estimates are varied, IMF and World Bank sources calculate 
that oil and gas account for roughly “20 percent of the country’s GDP, generated 
more than 60 percent of its export revenues, and accounted for 30 percent of all 
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FDI in the country.”33  Even though 30 percent of the FDI can attributed to energy 
exports further progression of private enterprises, as previously mentioned, have 
been met with serious roadblocks by the state.  State owned export companies 
have continued to grow and have slowly been buying out or forcing out 
previously owned and led foreign projects.  Despite politics, which will be 
discussed later, it is best to start with an analysis of what Russia currently has 
with respects to its various energy sectors. 
 
B. ENERGY SITUTATION BY SECTOR 
Over the past several years Russia has developed into one of the world’s 
greatest energy powerhouses.  Russia currently has the eighth largest oil 
reserves in the world.  It is the largest non-OPEC producer of oil, ranking second 
behind Saudi Arabia in total production.  It makes up 12 percent of the global 
production and export of oil and according to the Oil and Gas Journal, “Russia 
has proven oil reserves of 60 billion barrels, most of which are located in Western 
Siberia, between the Ural Mountains and the Central Siberian Plateau.”34  As of 
2006, Russia had an oil production capability of almost 9.2 million bb/d, down 
from 12.5 million bb/d during the Soviet era, which leaves room for future growth.  
“Russian oil production is expected to grow at an annual rate of around 1.5-2.5 
percent.”35  However, not all is well with the oil sector.  There has traditionally 
been little investment in field maintenance of equipment, the majority of the oil 
only comes from a few fields which has already yielded 80 percent of their 
recoverable resources, and the poor state of its refineries could result in declines 
in oil versus ever increasing expectations.    A couple of new fields have been 
brought on line over the past few years, but without western expertise in 
searching for new finds or allowing FDI to help offset the price of exploration and 
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establishing these new fields, it won’t be enough by 2020.  Additionally, Russia’s 
refinery capability is not as secure as they should be.  In 2006 Russian refineries 
produced 4.4 million bb/d which is below their capacity of 5.4 million bb/d, due to 
inefficiencies and the fact that the refineries are very old and in need of major 
modernization.  Nevertheless, Russia produced roughly 9.8 million bb/d of liquids 
while only consuming 2.8 million bb/d leaving around 7 million bb/d for 
exportation.  Figure 2 provides an excellent snapshot of the oil situation as well 
as natural gas.   
 
Figure 2.   Russia’s Historical and Potential Oil and Gas Fields36 
Russia’s second energy sector under discussion is natural gas.  Just like 
oil, Russia is rich in natural gas and actually controls the world’s largest proven 
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gas reserves at 32 percent, which equates to nearly twice the reserves of the 
next largest country (Iran) at 1,680 trillion cubic feet (Tcf).   
Russia is the world’s largest exporter of natural gas, the dominant 
gas supplier to Europe and the neighboring former Soviet states, 
and a major provider of oil.  Some countries are entirely or largely 
dependent upon Russian natural gas.  Of Russia’s total natural gas 
exports of 7.1 Tcf in 2004, 6.7 Tcf went to European countries, 
including destinations in Eastern Europe.37   
Initial analysis of Russian natural gas would indicate that Russia has leverage 
over the rest of the world, however that is not the case.  Politically, Gazprom is a 
burden, which will be discussed later.  Nevertheless, Gazprom produces 90 
percent of Russia’s natural gas and operates the country’s natural gas pipeline 
network, but the industry is in decline due to “aging fields, state regulation, 
Gazprom’s monopolistic control over the industry, and insufficient export 
pipelines.”38   According to an International Energy Agency (IEA) report, 
“Gazprom’s three largest fields are declining at an average rate of 700 Bcf per 
year, necessitating around 6,100 Bcf per year of new production by 2015,”39 just 
to simply maintain current production levels.  Of all the natural resources, natural 
gas could be Russia’s greatest asset, however it also the most likely to be used 
by the Kremlin as a political tool.  Large quantities of gas are used domestically 
bust sold at an extremely under priced (roughly 15-20 percent of market price) 
rate and it has to rely on shipping much of its gas through various countries that 
are not necessarily the best business partners.  These factors will also be 
discussed later, as the focus shifts to coal. 
In addition to owning some of the largest oil and gas reserves, Russia also 
possesses the world’s second largest coal reserves at approximately 173 billion 
short tons.  Traditionally coal has not been a significant export, but coal 
production has seen a marked increase over the past several years.  “Russian 
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energy ministry sources estimate that 2005 coal production was 269.6 million 
short tons,”40 with estimates that Russia could produce between 441 and 496 
million short tons by 2020.  Additional income could result if exports to the former 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) continue to increase, but this is not 
expected due to Russia’s recent agreement to follow the Kyoto Protocol.   
However, if Russia could develop and use cleaner forms of coal, similar to the 
United States, there is no telling where this industry could end up in the future. 
The final energy sector that factors into the total energy equation in Russia 
is nuclear power.  With the Kyoto Protocols reducing the amount of coal 
consumed the need for more and more electricity increasing every year, Russia 
has had to turn to consuming greater amount of natural gas to make up the 
difference.  However, this also reduces Russia’s ability to provide ample supplies 
to its customers.  This has resulted in Russia investing in and relying more and 
more upon nuclear energy with plans to expand the role of nuclear power in the 
future.  “Russia has an installed nuclear capacity of 21.2 million kilowatts, 
distributed across 31 operational nuclear reactors at 10 locations.”41  However, 
Russia’s nuclear power facilities are seriously aging, fifteen of the plants are at 
least 22 years old with nine of the plants between 28 and 30 years old.  This may 
not seem old but the operational life of a reactor is considered to be 30 years.  If 
proper efforts are taken the lifespan can be extended past 30 years.  Estimates 
in upgrading and decommissioning those that can’t be upgraded are placed 
between $5 and $10 billion per year over the next ten years.  Even though the 
Russians can afford the $50 to $100 billion, based on the revenue earned from 
oil and gas exports, it decided not to do so.  The main reasons were that nuclear 
fuel costs were rising above other fuels like natural gas and many of the plants 
were poorly designed along the lines of the ill fated Chernobyl plant and it would 
be better to simply close them.  On July 15, 2006, Russia approved a “$55 billion 
nuclear energy program that calls for the completion of ten new 1,000 megawatt 
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reactors, with an additional ten under construction, by 2015.”42  The new reactors 
will generate much larger quantities of energy but until they all come on line and 
the inefficient ones are closed, oil and gas that could be exported will continue to 
be consumed domestically. The weaning off of domestic oil and gas in order to 
export more is a concept Russia is more than aware of when it comes to its 
overall perception of its energy situation. 
 
C. RUSSIA’S ENERGY PERCEPTION 
Russia has quickly become one of the most critical suppliers of energy to 
Europe, but this is not necessarily a good thing.  Russia has become dependent 
upon Europe’s need for energy as a means to provide a majority of its annual 
income.  At the same time Europe has become dependent upon Russian energy 
to sustain its variety of rapidly growing economies which need greater and 
greater amounts of energy to keep them running.  When looking at energy 
security from Russia’s viewpoint there are several strategic considerations.   
The state already holds controlling stakes in the country’s largest 
hydrocarbons companies, and this consolidation trend is likely to 
continue.  The pipeline networks also remain overwhelmingly in 
government hands.  The ostensible rationale behind the current 
nationalization drive is to ensure that Russian people, and not oil 
companies or end consumers, reap the benefits from the 
exploitation of Russia’s natural wealth.43   
When looking at energy security politically, the Kremlin does not admit to “using 
energy supplies as a political weapon, although it certainly regards energy power 
as instrumental to achieving political goals unrelated to energy.”44  This means 
that most of the Energy produced in, and exported from Russia is controlled by 
the state and in turn has become the “biggest stick” behind its foreign policies.  A 
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assertion recently proven when Gazprom warned that it would cut gas supplies to 
Ukraine over $1.3 billion in debt that it says are owed to it by Naftogaz Ikrainy, 
Ukraine’s state gas distributor.  The political ramifications of which will be 
discussed in the next section.  Needless to say, the Russian government has the 
power to restrict both the export of their oil and gas as well as its production, but 
this is not the most disconcerting issue.   
Of even greater concern, is that Russia, in general, does not look 
favorably upon direct foreign investment into its oil and gas industry.   
Russia demands non-discriminatory access for state gas giant 
Gazprom to lucrative downstream assets in Europe.  Russian 
officials view the obstacles encountered by Gazprom and its 
affiliates as unfair business practices.  They believe that West 
European governments and rival European gas companies are 
behind attempts to block Gazprom’s expansion.45    
Besides, Russian’s are generally leery of internally investing what little they have 
due, not only to the lack of faith in their own government, but also to past 
experiences during the early nineteen nineties when many people lost their 
investments to less than reputable oligarchs.   
A closely associated obstacle and probably Russia’s largest is that the 
country’s energy infrastructure is serious need of modernization.  The current 
network of pipes, both oil and liquefied natural gas are rapidly decaying.  Also, 
the pipes that Russia does have are no longer sufficient nor have the capacity to 
transport the required demand.  Basically, Russia’s entire domestic market is in 
definite need of redevelopment to not only cover the direction pipelines are 
currently oriented, but new ones need to be built north to south for domestic 
needs.    
About 80 percent of the entire Russian pipeline system, parts of 
which dates backs to the 1950s, was oriented toward export, rather 
than domestic consumption.  Lack of pipeline capacity, and 
resulting local dependence on tanker trucks and rail, increases the 
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threat of hijackings and sabotage, dries up transportation costs and 
raises the likelihood of illegal ‘cut-ins’ and siphoning.46   
 
Figure 3.   Russian Pipeline Orientation47 
Figure 3, provides an excellent picture of the general east west orientation 
of Russian pipelines.  Oil and gas are not the only industries in need of 
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modernization.  The recent coalmine catastrophe merely highlights the history of 
the hazardous state of “Russia's mining industry, which fell into disrepair when 
government subsidies dried up after the Soviet collapse.”48  Many blame union 
officials and unrealistic quotas, but it comes back to lack of capital.  President 
Putin refuses to allocate funds to “modernize the economy and infrastructure.  
Instead he keeps the money in foreign banks as a strong guarantee against 
economic or political losses.”49  As time progresses, this attitude will only push 
Russia further behind the developed nations and make them uncompetitive in 
international markets; an affliction called “Dutch disease”  as a situation that 
results when a  
country’s excessive dependence on the export of raw materials can 
have serious economic consequences as a country becomes 
increasingly dependent on that raw material sector.   Even more 
dangerous is the leader’s loss of a sober assessment of reality.50   
While Russia is not beyond recovery, Putin’s aggressiveness has increased over 
the past two years and his actions are quite reflective of a country that has been 
afflicted with this syndrome.   
Another factor that does not help is that Russia is one of the most 
inefficient users of energy in the world.   
At a time when Russia aims to increase its oil and gas production 
for domestic and foreign markets, the country’s pipeline networks 
are incapable of meeting producers’ ambitions.  Up to 60 percent of 
the Russian pipeline network is in need of modernization.  For its 
export market, Russia produces almost 7 million barrels per day of 
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transported by major trunk pipelines.  For the remainder, Russia 
depends on more vulnerable and expensive rail and maritime 
transportation routes.51 
Russia’s inherent inefficiency translates into higher production costs that will be 
passed on to consumers in the form of higher prices and, as previously 
mentioned, will result in those consumers turning to other sources.  “If internal 
consumption is progressively ‘eating’ the export margin, there is no Energy 
Security for customer countries.” 52   This is another important Energy Security 
dimension and one that is particularly relevant for not only Russia, but for its 
European partners.  When compared to Europe and the United States, Russia is 
significantly under levels of primary energy consumption per capita unit.  
However, when energy consumption is compared to purchasing power parity, as 
well as energy efficiency, Russia is two and a half to three higher than its 
counterparts (higher is not better).  If Russia could become more efficient like 
their western counterparts large reserves of energy would be saved to meet their 
international commitments.  One final minor background point is that Europe is 
not Russia’s only customer.  The government’s efforts to “diversify supply routes 
for Russian hydrocarbons are designed to encourage competition among 
Russia’s Asian and Western customers.”53  However, the pipelines are not 
geared to divert supply from west to east or vice versa.  The needs of both 
partners are currently different, so the future competition that the Russians say 
they are expecting only appears to be veiled threats to keep the Europeans in 
line.   
 Regardless of the situation, the one thing that energy distributors have to 
adhere to over the long term is the demands of market forces.   
Free markets are usually very good at delivering commodities.  But 
in the case of energy there are some problems.  First the raw 
materials are often in places that are hostile, remote, or both; 
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Europe increasingly relies on gas from Russia.  Second, energy is 
so essential that an interruption to supply could bring the economy 
grinding to a halt.  Third, the high cost of energy grids and pipelines 
means that suppliers are often natural monopolies.54   
European countries are focused on the economic value of energy security while 
Russia, on the other hand, is looking at the entire continent as potential buyers.  
Russia is not only focused on their current customers in central and Eastern 
Europe, but also on more distant customers like France and Spain.       
 
Table 1.   Major Russian Oil and Natural Gas Pipeline Projects55 
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One important factor the Europeans tend to forget is that Russia is 
concurrently focused on expanding its energy distribution into other parts of the 
world.  Many of Russia’s actions might seem to be taken at the expense of the 
Europeans, but Russia also has customers to its east and south that have to be 
taken into account.  As can be seen by Table 1 above, Russia currently has eight 
expensive oil and natural gas projects at various points in their construction.   
Finally, the “confusion between energy dependence and the issue of energy 
security has clouded approaches to the question of the economic risk in the 
European market.”56  Fortunately, trading between Europe and Russia is 
determined by market principles.  Stable long-term contracts based on 
commitments by credible entities keeps the market thriving.   
 
D. THE POLICY DEBATE 
When looking at how to best correct the collective problem between 
Russia and the rest of Europe with regards energy security, consistent demand, 
and reliable supply the current policy debate is relatively simple.  Each of the 
three aforementioned approaches could apply to the situation, but Russia’s past 
actions clearly show that it is interested in only one.  President Putin has 
drastically consolidated national interests in the hope to vastly improve Russia’s 
competitiveness across international markets.  Additionally, Russia’s energy 
strategy calls for 
Reorienting the energy lobby’s push from capturing specific 
markets to upgrading Russia’s stature in various markets around 
the globe.  Emphasis was placed on tapping the country’s vast 
resource potential and export infrastructure to preserve Russia’s 
exclusive role as the largest provider of energy raw materials in the 
international community.  The focal point of strategic energy policy 
was to steer market mechanisms to uphold the country’s role as 
primes inter pares (first among equals) in the Eurasian gas 
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equation, and to exploit this dominance as a springboard for 
achieving competitive advantages in global markets.57 
Therefore, the EU centric approach has absolutely no redeeming value for 
Russia in the immediate future.  There is absolutely no reason that Russia would 
be prefer a united Europe in which the customer has a more advantageous 
negotiating position than the supplier.  Fortunately for Russia, the Europeans 
cannot come to agreement on a common energy policy leaving it as a non-
relevant and un-viable solution for Europe. Another reason Russia would not 
seek to pursue this approach is that anything that could unite Europe in reducing 
its dependence on Russian energy would greatly destabilize Russia in the long 
run.  In turn, this would result in a less secure Russia, in which nobody is 
interested.  On the other hand, even if the EU could establish a common policy, 
Russia would never actively seek this approach because it would limit its control 
over the market and reduce the international influence it has desperately been 
seeking to regain, and has actually gained, over the past several years. 
Another approach that the Russia’s will never actively seek to pursue is 
the one sponsored by the United States.  The objective is to simply come up with 
a way to establish alternate routing systems.  The plan is for developing 
redundancy in the system to prevent legitimate physical breakdowns or other 
political issues that might lead to Russia cutting off supply.  The plan is supposed 
to try to prevent Russia from using energy as a political weapon.  Unfortunately, 
this approach is often associated with that which NATO favors, because Russia 
only views NATO as U.S. expansionism.  NATO advisers have warned the 
military alliance that it “needs to guard against any attempt by Russia to set up 
an ‘OPEC for gas’ that would strengthen Moscow’s leverage over Europe.”58  As 
previously mentioned Russia is leery of any further military expansion by NATO 
and they have a right to be.   
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NATO governments have already been involved in military efforts to 
secure energy resources.  In the 1980s, Operation Earnest Will, 
was an effort explicitly designed to secure the supply of oil.  
Specifically the operation was designed to protect tanker traffic in 
the Gulf during the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988).59   
If that was the only intrusion by NATO then the concern would not be as great, 
but as recent as February 2006,  
NATO governments discussed a range of potential actions in the 
event of future disruption of oil supplies caused by military actions.  
NATO is attempting to become a global security organization, but 
concentrating on protecting the interest of the United States and its 
European partners.60   
Thus proving that the last thing Russia desires is for NATO to get involved in 
energy supply and distribution, even though they would be ideal to help provide 
security of potentially vulnerable pipelines.  “Only a madman could think that 
Russia would start to blackmail Europe using gas, because we depend to the 
same extent on European customers.”61  At the moment Russia does not have to 
fear NATO because the organization is still struggling to actually define energy 
security due to the diversity of all the various countries national interests.  This is 
a situation quite similar to the EU’s common energy policy and one that does not 
appear to be resolved quickly.  However NATO will eventually settle on a policy 
and the Russian’s would be remiss if they did not take advantage of anything the 
organization is pushing for.  “It has called on individual member states such as 
Poland and Finland to explore bilaterally with Russia ways to strengthen 
protection of pipelines that carry crucial gas supplies to Western Europe.”62  If 
Russia waits they may not like the results of a unified NATO policy which would 
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most likely favor U.S. companies while at the same time touch on the foreign 
investment taboo that Russia is extremely resistant towards. 
This only leaves the go it alone approach for Russia to pursue.  This 
approach might appear hostile at first, but it is the one most highly favored by 
Russians in general.  This approach actually gives Russia much more leeway in 
how it interacts with its various customers and it permits Russia to freely seek 
agreements that maximizes its greatest interests.  While many economists would 
argue that this is not a problem and simply market forces working at their best, 
the Europeans need to be cautions.  Without the protection of an EU-wide 
common energy policy, Russia will be able to sway individual members of the EU 
into less than desirable one-on-one contracts because European nations are not 
negotiating from a position of strength.  Additionally, the revenue from only one 
country is nothing compared to the revenue Russia receives from Europe as a 
whole.  Russia can sustain the loss of partial revenue, however few countries can 
survive on less than half of the energy it is accustomed to consuming and will 
give in to Russia before Russia ever notices or feels any discomfort from the loss 
of a few dollars.  Then there is the recent situation between Russia and the 
Ukraine, where a nation with a large outstanding debt to Russia is being 
manipulated in various ways similar to conventional “mob” tactics to repay that 
debt.     
During the first week of October 2007, Russia warned the Ukraine that it 
could cut gas supplies concerning a dispute over the $1.3 billion in debt it owes 
for past gas shipments.  Gazprom likes to “present itself as a purely commercial 
company.  But the Russian state-controlled gas group gave a spectacular 
demonstration of its political clout.”63  The decision to potentially cut off gas 
supplies actually came  
just as the counting of election votes seemed to indicate that the 
next Ukrainian government would be a pro-western coalition, to 
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replace the outgoing Russia-friendly regime.  If Gazprom wanted to 
be seen to be totally even-handed, it should have announced that 
Ukraine owed it more than $1 billion in unpaid gas bills at the same 
time it accused neighboring Belarus of owing $456 million at the 
end of the July.64          
Russia would argue that Belarus is different from Ukraine, in that the decision to 
cut off supplies to Belarus was due to Belarus unpredictable behavior of 
siphoning off gas.  Russia tends to forget that this was simply an act of 
desperation following the unexpected decision by Russia to double the price of 
gas it charged Belarus.  Nevertheless, when returning back to the issue with 
Ukraine, Gazprom continues to say it is only driven by commercial motives and 
any other country in their position would want to collect a running debt of $1.3 
billion.  Perhaps there is more to the issue than just money.  The first question is 
why would a company allow such a large debt to be accumulated in the first 
plane?  Many nations run on deficits, but there are few companies that can afford 
to do so, unless it was in their best interests.  For years Gazprom has been trying 
to reduce its dependence on transit countries (Belarus and Ukraine) for its gas 
shipments.  Many in the oil sector would also like to do the same, but they are 
not as large as Gazprom nor do they have the potential political opportunity to do 
so.  The behavior reminds, the already quoted Financial Times columnist Quentin 
Peel of  
the detested “gombeen man” in colonial Ireland, a sort of rural loan 
shark who allowed his customers to run up big debts at usurious 
interest rates, which could be paid off only by selling him their land.  
Gazprom has succeeded in taking 50 percent ownership of the 
pipeline through Belarus, but has so far failed in Ukraine.65   
Perhaps this is the answer to the question, but even if it is not the situation needs 
to be monitored closely.  Gazprom never starts or does anything without 
overwhelming approval from Moscow while constantly insisting that no matter 
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what actions are taken; Europe will continue to get all their gas in the full amount.  
As for now it looks as if the situation has temporarily been resolved.  The 
Ukraine, on October 9, 2007, signed an agreement with Russia to pay $900 
million in cash as well as transfer back $1.2 billion worth in gas back to Gazprom.  
The problem with this deal is that it will probably only temporally alleviate future 
supply cut offs.  Russia can only see the benefits of continuing its strong-arm 
energy politics.  Observers warned that it “significantly boosted Gazprom’s 
leverage in future talks with Ukraine, whose pipeline system serves as the key 
artery for Russian supplies to Europe.”66       
Speaking of Russian involvement with pipelines, another excellent 
example of Russia’s mentality, especially with regards to using energy politically, 
is the Baltic pipeline.  Even though this pipeline is not yet complete it will cost 
Germany billions of dollar.  Could this place Germany in a similar position to 
Belarus and the Ukraine?  Perhaps, but this very issue will be covered in much 
greater detail in the German case study.  In the meantime, variations of these 
three basic ideas can be observed in almost every possible solution, but one 
feature needs to be clear.   
There should be no illusions about Russian potential: Saudi Arabia 
will continue to be the dominant player in the global market.  Russia 
lacks both the surge capacity and the export infrastructure to battle 
Saudi Arabia successfully.  Yet this should not prevent Russia from 
becoming a more significant player.67   
The west’s policy towards Mr. Putin is to “be nice to him. Never mind that the 
Russian leader has stifled democracy and civil liberties; forget the Kremlin’s use 
of arbitrary power to seize the country’s assets,”68 as well as all of the other 
                                            
66 Roman Olearchyk and Neil Buckley, “Ukraine repays Gazprom debt in cash and gas,” 
Financial Times, October 10, 2007, 4. 
67 David Quayat, “The Russian Oil Sector and the Global Oil Economy: A Prospectus,” SAIS 
Review, 23.2, 2003, 9, http://proquest.umi.com.libproxy.mps.navy.mil/ (accessed 24 January 
2007). 
68 Philip Stephens, “The west pays a heavy price for foreign policy realism,” Financial Times, 
London, October 14, 2005, 19, http://proquest.umi.com.libproxy.mps.navy.mil/ (accessed 23 
January 2007). 
 34
diplomatic constraints.  Perhaps the only reason the United States and Britain 
continue to be nice to him is Russia’s possession of nuclear weapons.  There is 
definitely a double standard when dealing with repressive regimes.  Whether or 
not to intervene or be pragmatic has been a point of contention for quite some 
time.  For example, “The Iraq war has polarized the debate about how western 
democracies should treat tyrants.”69  Most western leaders have reverted to the 
notion that foreign policy is not either/or, however honest realism would argue 
otherwise.  In the meantime, two things remain constant, “Mr. Putin wants to be 
treated as an equal on the international stage and Russia needs to sell its oil and 
gas as much as Europe needs to buy it.”70     
A bright spot in the foreign policy world emerged with Germany’s new 
Chancellor Angela Merkel who remains committed to her country’s special 
relationship with Russia.  Both the chancellor and Russian President Vladimir 
Putin agreed to terms in Dresden in early 2006 to develop strategic relations 
between Russia and the EU by “placing the main emphasis on the 
implementation of the road maps leading to the establishment of four common 
spaces of co-operations.”71  This has real significance for Germany too by 
providing real leadership for the rest of the continent while working on the new 
Russia-EU Treaty Strategy Partnership.  There is also great concern because “if 
handled badly, Russia’s energy diplomacy has the potential to divide the EU just 
as much as the U.S.-led war against Iraq did three (now four) years ago.”72 
However, in an ideal world, the Europeans and Russians could co-develop 
a shared policy on competition in the energy market and security of supply.  Such 
a policy would most likely  
support new production from alternative sources: marginal gas 
fields in Western Europe, gas captured from abandoned coalfields 
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and rubbish dumps, and facilities to import gas by tanker from 
overseas.  Policy makers should also promote diversity of supply, 
using incentives for renewable energy.  Such measures will work 
regardless of whether energy companies own their own pipelines.73   
This would be a significant breakthrough since the very lack of ownership of 
pipelines is one of the main factors that weighed heavily in the gas wars.  With 
this revelation, the discussion has come full circle, however on thing will continue 
to remain constant and plague Russia until it changes its ways.  It simply does 
not matter “who is right or who is wrong in these disputes.  The threat to cut off 
supplies will once again damage the image of Russia as a player on the world 
energy markets.”74 
 
E. RUSSIA’S ROAD AHEAD  
When all is said and done, Russia’s has the option to pursue whatever it 
wants.  There are obvious advantages in continuing along the bilateral approach 
versus the others.  Some of the European nations even prefer bilateral 
agreements, which is very surprising.  There is also some potential for the EU 
centric approach, but only if it includes Russia.  If the EU establishes a policy that 
is to the detriment of Russia, it has absolutely no chance of success.  There is 
also some merit for the U.S. led approach, but it comes with additional problems, 
which could be a problem in the long run.  The current level of anti-Americanism 
is extremely high in Europe and the continent in general is fed up with 
globalization.  Perhaps for once, the United States should let Europe solve some 
of its own problems.  The Cold War is over, Europe has been rebuilt for 70 years 
following the devastation of World War II, and while the U.S. still needs to provide  
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assurances, it is time for the continent to take the lead.  With this in mind, the 
textbook answer of how the world, specifically how the EU, should deal with 
Russia is straightforward.  
The case for a joint response to Russian oil and gas imperialism is 
overwhelming.  Yet, Germany and others prefer to deal with Russia 
on a bilateral basis, often undermining the wider EU interest in the 
process.75   
Although in my opinion, Russia should seek out multilateral relations with the 
European Union, as opposed to bilateral relations with individual members.  
Circumstances that drive Russia toward bilateral agreements are the larger 
short-term gains.  The reason for these gains is that each individual agreement 
can be tailored to maximize profit and pit other members against each other.  In 
this situation, the supplier has the advantage.  When you seek agreements with a 
group, options become limited and customers gain leverage.  However, if Russia 
continues to seek individual agreements, what prevents countries that negotiated 
a lower price from selling their surplus to other countries at a rate lower than the 
Russians?  As mentioned before, Individual agreements can destabilize the 
continent.  The completion of the Baltic pipeline could further complicate relations 
because there may be the potential for disagreement between Germany and 
Poland, two members of the EU that have previously been united in their 
negative feelings toward Russia over the past century.    
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III. GERMANY 
A. INTRODUCTION TO EUROPE 
With Russia’s position in the energy security debate established it is time 
to focus on how Europe views the situation.  Before jumping into the two 
European case studies of Germany and Poland, however, it is necessary to first 
establish what the current position is toward energy security within the European 
Union as a whole.  Without a doubt, energy is probably the most divisive issue 
facing the European Union today.   
Tensions between Poland and Germany have been raised by a 
Russo-German plan to build a new gas pipeline under the Baltic 
Sea.  But while the Germans are placing their bets on securing 
long-term supplies from Russia, some other EU countries are 
scrambling to diversify their sources of supply – alarmed by the 
prospect that Russia could threaten to turn off the gas, as it did with 
Ukraine in 2006.  Britain has its deal with Norway.  The Brits and 
the Finns are constructing big new nuclear power stations.76     
To make matters worse, it is estimated that in 25 years time, Gazprom might be 
one of only three gas suppliers left in the world.  Conversely, Europe is almost 
the complete opposite of Russia in terms of availability of natural resources.   
The continent of Europe lacks sufficient energy, as can be seen in Figure 
4 below, particularly in the form of oil and natural gas to meet its past and 
current, much less future, needs and is in a position of great dependence on 
Russia.  “According to European Commission forecasts up to 2030, energy 
dependence (for all categories of energy) will rise from 52% in 2004 to about 
75% in 2030.”77   Although becoming more energy efficient will aid in becoming 
less energy dependent, it will not be the salvation of Europe’s future.  European 
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countries have massively improved their energy efficiency, however “more 
efficiency gains will be costly as most wastages have been addressed and 
energy saving return per 1 Euro of investment is clearly decreasing.”78   
 
Figure 4.   2003 European Union Energy Consumption v/s Production79 
An additional problem lies in the fact that the European Union (EU) does not 
have any direct control over its energy policy.  In the short term, The International 
Energy Agency (IEA) is “responsible for oil supplies through coordination of 
strategic reserves, but there is no collective approach to the problem for gas.”80  
Additionally, about “80% of Europe’s energy markets are rigid, while the rest 
suffer all the price volatility.”81 What is needed is a common and comprehensive 
energy policy regarding all forms of energy.  Repeated attempts have been made 
to establish a common policy, but this is quite a difficult task.  There are 27 
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members of the EU from all over the continent with varying cultural backgrounds; 
there are also several other countries currently applying for membership, which 
will only complicate the future situation even further. 
Further complicating the EU’s attempt to establish better energy relations 
with Russia is that by comparison to Russia, most Europeans view energy 
security primarily in economic and political terms versus energy simply as a 
profit-maximizing endeavor.  Additionally, even though Russia is willing to 
cooperate with customers “in the hopes of securing bigger political and economic 
payoffs, the government was (and is) more inclined to use natural gas as a lever 
to foil regional diversification."82  As for now, the Europeans want Moscow to 
allow European companies access to Russian reserves, which Moscow 
adamantly opposes.   Hypocritically though, Russia continues to seek and secure 
access in European markets.  As a result, this has created an unhealthy 
relationship that has granted Russia too much leverage in European energy 
markets.  Consequently, the EU has had to take significant actions to prevent 
Russia from reducing competition between energy companies, establishing a 
cartel like atmosphere, and reducing energy security in Europe.   
Basically, the Europeans have significant energy needs and limited 
options available to them.   
At one extreme, there is Austria, landlocked and even more 
vulnerable on energy issues than Germany.  Austria has banned 
nuclear power and the use of any energy derived from it.  At the 
other end, there are examples like France, which has lived 
comfortably for some time with more than 70 percent of its power 
coming from nuclear plants.83   
If extrapolated, Europe’s situation comes down to the fact that “other energy 
sources, particularly renewable sources are far from being mature, and some 
others are raising strong political opposition.”84  Some EU governments believe 
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that close cooperation with Russia in energy commerce will not lead to energy 
security, but as of now there is no substantial alternative to European countries.  
The one thing that keeps coming up is that Russia figures to be an important 
supplier for many years to come.  The two-country analysis, which follows, 
provides a revealing snapshot of the continent.  Germany is the largest consumer 
of Russian energy, and currently imports 32 percent of its energy needs from 
Russia while Poland imports two-thirds of its natural gas needs and 97 percent of 
its oil.  Some Central and East European countries have “made significant efforts 
to switch away from Russian imports in recent years, and satisfy diverse energy 
demands from a range of sources.”85  Nevertheless, a majority of the countries in 
Europe are still dependent upon Russia to provide them with desperately needed 
supplies of energy to meet their daily needs because they just cannot afford the 
costs of the alternatives.   
 
B. GERMANY:  BACKGROUND 
Germany experienced some of its toughest times immediately following 
the reunification with East Germany, however those days of want and need are 
quickly becoming a memory.  In recent years economic growth has reemerged 
and has propelled Germany into one of the largest economies in the world.  With 
a 2005 gross domestic product of approximately $2.8 trillion, Germany has also 
become one of the world’s largest energy consumers.  Except for coal, Germany 
has limited domestic energy resources, does not have sizeable hydrocarbon 
reserves, and must heavily rely on imports to meet the majority of its energy 
needs.  However, before delving into the energy relationship between Germany 
and Russia, the environment of what Germany has, with regards to energy 
reserves versus what it requires.     
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C. ENERGY SITUATION BY SECTOR 
Germany is currently the fifth largest oil consumer in the world and 
consumes roughly 2.65 million barrels of oil per day.  It has "367 million barrels of 
proven oil reserves (as of January 2006), with most of these reserves located in 
northern and northeastern Germany.”86  However these reserves cannot even 
come close to providing what is consumed as can be seen in Figure 5.  
 
Figure 5.   German Oil Consumption87 
Most of the oil produced internally comes from only one field and when operating 
at peak efficiency only provides approximately 67,000 bbl/d.  Projecting forward 
current consumption, Germany will end up importing over 2.1 million bbl/d in 
2007 alone.  Some estimates calculate that Germany might need to import 
upward of 90% of the oil it needs each year, with the largest source of imports 
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coming from “Russia (34 percent), followed by Norway (16 percent), the United 
Kingdom (12 percent), and Libya (12 percent).”88 
In addition to oil, Germany needs vast supplies of natural gas.  Per figure 
6, Germany is the third largest consumer of natural gas in the world, consuming 
approximately 3.7 Trillion Cubic Feet (Tcf) each year, based on 2004 usage.  As 
of 2006, the country has 9.1 Tcf of proven natural gas reserves, however there 
are problems in getting what it has into production and to the consumer.   
 
Figure 6.   German Natural Gas Consumption89 
The majority of Germany’s reserves and production “occur in the northwestern 
state of Niedersachsen, however governmental regulations have curtailed the 
complete exploration and development of the area.”90  Germany also operates a 
single off shore natural gas field, but total production in Germany is only about 
730 Billion Cubic Feet (Bcf), which means, it has to import almost 3 Tcf of natural 
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gas per year.  “The largest source of natural gas imports was from Russia (46 
percent), followed by Norway (33 percent) and the Netherlands (23 percent).”91 
The third energy sector and one in which Germany is actually doing better 
than other European countries is coal, although, even small amounts of coal 
needs to be imported to meet its demands.  Germany has the largest coal 
reserves in the European Union and they are the seventh largest producer of 
coal in the world, yet they are also the world’s fourth largest consumer of coal.   
 
Figure 7.   German Coal Consumption92 
The problem lies in that many of the mines in Germany reside in the eastern part 
of the country, which were built by the former Soviet Union and are severely 
inefficient.  An additional problem in bringing coal to production is that most of it 
is very deep underground and extremely expensive to extract.  Over half of the 
coal that is brought to production resides in the Rhineland region in the western 
part of the country.   As previously mentioned, this means that, like oil and 
natural gas, Germany will also need to import coal in order to meet its domestic 
needs.  Additionally, with current and expected estimates of domestic coal 
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production declining, reliance on foreign coal is going to grow.  As of 2006, 
“Poland was the single largest source of these imports (23 percent), followed by 
South Africa (22 percent) and Russia (20 percent).”93 
The last sector for analysis is nuclear power.  Germany is the fourth 
largest producer of nuclear power in the world.  In 2004 they were only behind 
the United States, France, and Japan.  Germany has 17 operational nuclear 
power plants with two plants currently shut down.  Nuclear power provides the 
Germans extra capacity to make up the difference between what is needed 
versus the amount of material Germany can import to meet all of its energy 
needs.  However, nuclear power has always been controversial and with recent 
gains in political power by the Green party of the current coalition government 
nuclear power most likely will not continue into the middle of the century.  Two 
nuclear power plants have already been shut down with two more scheduled to 
be phased out by 2009.   Current plans call for the closure of all nuclear power 
plants by 2022.  Which means that unless things change Germany is going to 
become even more dependent on imports from energy rich nations.   
 
D. THE ENERGY DEBATE 
All of this leads to the fact that Germany needs to import vast sums of 
energy and fortunately for Germany, Russia has been able to supply 
approximately 70 percent of that need.  The current energy situation between 
Germany and Russia is very delicate.  It consists of a balancing act with both 
sides desiring the security that long-tern bilateral agreements provide while at the 
same time attempting to regain what is perceived as lost foreign policy 
independence.  This means that each may provoke the other at times to gain 
political support at home.  Yet, the general topics of the bilateral meetings 
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between the two countries remain mostly the same.  Germany needs the energy 
and Russia needs the income from selling its surplus energy to Germany.   
Politically, relations between the two countries have been very cold at 
times, but relations actually started to grow warmer under Chancellor Merkel’s 
predecessor, Gerhard Schroeder and have since remained favorable.  Since 
1997 Germany has been the largest consumer of Russian energy in Europe.  
Schroeder’s efforts to warm relations started with regularly scheduled summits 
between him and Russian President Vladimir Putin.  President Putin also sought 
friendlier relations with Germany in the hope of securing long-term demands for 
energy exports.  Their summits routinely discussed the issues of trade and 
investment, World Trade Organization (WTO) accession, and energy.  However, 
both sides avoided contentious issues such as,  
Germany’s concerns about human rights and democracy in Russia, 
Moscow’s (initial) reluctance to sign the Kyoto Protocol on climate 
change or Germany’s apparent unwillingness to lobby within the EU 
for Russia’s WTO entry.94   
Today, Chancellor Merkel’s relationship with President Putin is not as close as 
her predecessor’s, but it is still favorable and she has frequently stated that 
“Germany’s foreign policy towards Russia will continue to be driven by mainly 
commercial interests, in particular the energy sector.”95   
The cost options facing Germany are very simple; either they continue to 
rely predominantly on Russia to supply most of its energy or they need to start 
looking for energy from other sources.  The relationship with Russia has provided 
them with the cheapest source of energy the market can provide, however, this 
relationship might come at more of a cost than the Germans anticipated.  
Politically, Germany is a catch twenty-two situation. Nuclear power is unpopular 
and is not as ideal as an “energy source due to waste products, but nuclear 
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power mitigates the dangers from a number of environmental problems, such as 
air pollution and climate change.”96  This is also why Germany cannot turn to 
coal or other contaminating forms of energy, If Germany truly intends to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions, “it will be committing itself to vastly stepping up 
energy conservation while also switching to new, and perhaps, as-yet un-
invented technologies,97 Although, as mentioned previously, Germany has 
already spent large sums of money on becoming more energy efficient.  Further 
efficiency is possible, but will come at a significant cost.  New technologies don’t 
always result in positive gains and could end up becoming a further burden on 
the German economy. 
From a trade aspect, German companies and industry have ambitious 
plans for the fast growing Russian market, but Russia has been more and more 
reluctant to permit foreign investment within its borders.  Additionally, Russia is in 
a much stronger position than it has been in the past.   
Germany had been Russia’s biggest national creditors, with debt 
amounting to about 20 billion dollars in 2004, although Russia has 
recently used its oil windfall to repay debt ahead of schedule.98   
This means that Russia, if it wanted to, could reduce the amount of energy it 
supplies to Germany, since it no longer needs income to pay off its debt to 
Germany, and use this energy as a political tool against not only Germany but 
also other nations.  Actually, this has recently become reality and should come 
as no surprise to Germany, since Russia previously used energy as a political 
tool against the Ukraine and later Belarus.  Britain’s “Financial Times” reported 
on August 25, 2007, that: 
Russia has made significant cuts to oil supplies sent to German 
refineries recently, rekindling concerns in Germany over the 
reliability of Russian energy supplies. LUKoil, Russia's second 
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largest oil producer, on [August 24] acknowledged that supplies to 
Germany had been reduced by about one-third in July and August 
but refused to explain why the reduction had occurred. The paper 
also added that, analysts said LUKoil's decision not to provide 
previously contracted quantities of oil could be aimed at extracting 
higher prices from German refineries or be part of LUKoil's efforts 
to acquire stakes in German and European refineries.99  
This aggressive strategy could also mean that Russia is planning to use energy 
as a means to acquire other non-German refining assets.  Germany's Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung reported on August 25, 2007, “an unnamed LUKoil official 
said that the company found it more profitable to ship its oil "in other directions 
because of increased transit fees in Belarus.”100  This is a situation that could 
easily be remedied if Russia had control of or partially owned refineries on the 
other end of the pipelines.  Shortly after the incident, reports in Germany later 
confirmed that oil deliveries from Russia had dropped recently and added that it 
was not the first time it had happened.   
Energy security in Germany is not going to come cheap or easily.  There 
are several ways in which Germany can seek steady energy supplies, but 
Germany is only as secure as its supplier, and for now Russia is not reliable.  In 
my opinion, Germany has to start looking elsewhere for energy.  Yet, Germany is 
proceeding in just the opposite direction and furthering its dependence upon 
Russia by investing in the development of a direct pipeline.  The Baltic pipeline, 
also known as the Nord Stream pipeline, is a six billion dollar 1200 kilometer 
North European Gas (SEG) pipeline and is currently undergoing construction. 
Early estimates predict that the pipeline could have a capacity upward of “27 
billion cubic meters of gas by 2010 with a total capacity of approximately 52 
billion cubic metes when the second pipeline is completed in 2013.”101   
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Figure 8.   North European Natural Gas Pipeline102 
The location of this pipeline was included in Figure 3, but the route of the pipeline 
is much clearer in the enlarged image of Figure 8.  This BASF and Gazprom joint 
venture will traverse Russia and Germany.  However, it will bypass both Belarus 
and Poland, two countries that have become reliant on transit fees, revisiting yet 
again an issue that has already brought both parties into conflict (non military) 
with Russia within the last year. 
This pipeline allows Russia to cut off gas supplies to Poland and 
others while maintaining steady deliveries to Germany.  There is no 
question that this pipeline will make Russia’s east European 
neighbors economically more dependent and politically more 
insecure.103   
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At the same time, the opposite is also true.  If Russia is willing to reduce or 
withhold gas (as indicated in the before mentioned Financial Times article) on a 
pipeline that has three countries involved then there is little to suggest that 
Russia would not be even more willing to do so on a pipeline that involves only 
one country. If Germany is not careful, there could be very little to prevent Russia 
from trying to force its way into the German energy market, just like it did in 
Belarus and is currently attempting to do in the Ukraine.  Let us not forget that 
Russia, specifically Lukoil, is interested in buying refineries in Europe and Lukoil 
has cut back supplies of oil in what might be considered as pressure to get 
Germany to sell their refineries in exchange.   Germany has yet to cede to this 
pressure, but it will be interesting to see what happens over the next few years. 
 
E. ENERGY POLICY 
Germany, like Russia, is in a unique position concerning energy security 
and its intimate relationships with not only Russia, but with the rest of Europe.  
Also like Russia, Germany is in a position in which all three aforementioned 
approaches could be applied to the resolve Germany’s energy dilemma, but 
unlike Russia the situation is a bit more complicated.  Germany could 
successfully pursue any of the approaches, but decisions made in developing its 
national energy strategy have steered it closer to one than the other two.  Before 
identifying which approach Germany prefers to pursue, it helps to know how it 
plans to pursue energy security in general.   
With regards to a national energy strategy, “German chancellor, Angela 
Merkel, announced an ambitious plan (on July 4, 2007) to reduce greenhouse 
emissions by up to 40 percent by 2020.”104  Yet, at the same time she also 
mentioned that Germany’s plan to reduce nuclear power has not changed and 
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intends to require that energy producers further increase their energy efficiency 
by 3 percent a year.  “This is about putting in place a long-term energy policy 
until 2020 for the environment that includes energy efficiency and energy 
security,”105 a statement made during a conference with Germany’s largest 
electricity, natural gas, and coal companies.  So, for the immediate future, 
Germany’s plan is to increase the use of renewable energy via combined heat 
and power plants to compensate for the decrease in nuclear power plants.  The 
energy industry however is highly critical of the plan with the overall opinion that 
the government’s energy policy is an anti-energy policy.  Many point out that the 
decision to reduce nuclear power was made before climate protection and the 
environment became important issues, however for the immediate future things 
are not likely to change until 2009 when the Merkel government officially expires.   
The first approach, which is not going to be pursued by Germany is the 
U.S. led and often NATO associated approach.  Despite the very close 
relationship Germany has had with the United States in the past and major role it 
plays in not only the EU, but NATO as well, Germany is not interested in the U.S. 
sponsored plan.  As previously quoted European governments view energy 
security in political and economic terms.  Germany is no different and it clearly 
prefers that market forces secure access to energy, versus what could be 
considered as a premature entry of NATO into the equation.   
Some EU governments also believe that discussion of energy 
security at NATO sends the wrong signal to other governments, 
which might assume that the allies are contemplating military action 
to ensure the flow of oil and gas.106 
Unfortunately, NATO is seen as mostly a U.S. led organization and no matter 
what message is sent to the contrary, NATO will only be seen as trying to secure 
pipelines, just like in Iraq.  Therefore Germany is not interested in any U.S. 
sponsored approach to the problem.  Germany most likely feels that if the U.S. 
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were to be involved the relationship with Russia, which has taken decades to 
establish, would be quickly sacrificed and is not worth the risk. 
The second approach discussed regarding Germany is the EU-centric 
approach.  Many would argue that Germany, being a major player and leader in 
the European Union, should be all in favor of establishing and seeking a EU-
centric approach to balance Russia’s energy aspirations.  Logically, any time 
there is one dominant, overbearing, and assertive power there is reason to 
believer that other smaller powers will come together in support of one another.  
It would be hard to argue against wanting to establish a mutual support 
mechanism, especially a plan that would enable EU members to counter 
disruption in supplies to another country.  If Russia were to use energy as a 
political weapon and shut off supplies, another EU country could simply making 
up the shortfall with any surplus it has.  However, this is also not the path 
Germany is seeking. 
Germany prefers to deal with Russia on a bilateral basis and remains 
“Russia’s favorite partner within the EU – and a willing accomplice in a diplomatic 
game in which Russia plays EU member states off against each other.”107  
Another factor that might limit the EU from gaining ground with its common policy 
is that Angela Merkel of Germany currently holds the EU presidency.   
Europe continues to talk about diversification of its energy sources.  
Yet coal is generally discouraged and there is confusion in many 
countries about whether to invest in new generation of nuclear 
power facilities.  The region has not invested sufficiently and quickly 
enough in liquefied natural gas terminals.  It leaves Europe facing a 
supply gap, according to Petroleum Economist, of up to 70bn cubic 
meters a year by 2012.108  
This is not to say that Merkel or Germany is complicit in any way, but it might be 
something that Europe as a whole might want to look into further.  The only 
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reason is that Germany has large reserves of coal and has been extremely 
resistant to furthering its dependence upon nuclear energy.  In short, Germany’s 
nuclear policy “is alienating other European states in particular Central European 
states who would increase nuclear energy were it not for EU restrictions.”109  
Germany also could potentially be in position to be the continent’s main 
distributor of surplus gas once the Baltic Sea pipeline is complete and leads to 
the approach that Germany prefers to pursue. 
 
F. GERMANY’S ROAD AHEAD 
There truly is not much to debate concerning Germany’s path toward 
linking itself even closer to Russia as its main energy supplier.  Apparently 
somewhere along the line the old Russian saying of fool me once shame on you, 
fool me twice shame on me, has been overlooked by the west and in particular 
Germany.  Nevertheless, Germany is geared toward implementing the third and 
final approach, that of going it alone and establishing a bilateral agreement with 
Russia.  In Germany’s defense, its options are limited by the policies of its 
government and decisions it has made over the past few years.  As previously 
mentioned, there are several factors involved in formulating a national energy 
strategy, critical time constraints necessary for making national energy decisions, 
and roles assigned to the private sector to assure adequate energy supplies.  In 
addition, it would be extremely difficult to step away from the billions of dollars 
already invested in building the Nord Stream pipeline.  Ironically though, other 
countries objected to Germany’s unilateral negotiations with Russia, but 
“Germany’s new government is suddenly worried about what this pipeline – and 
its firm dependence on Russia – will do for its own security of supply.”110   All of 
these factors directly influence how Germany judges Russia’s latest actions and 
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most likely blinds Germany to some of the things Russia does, because it is so 
deeply invested and intertwined with Moscow. 
Despite all of Germany’s efforts to become a “greener” country with 
regards to energy consumption, the only thing that is going to happen is that its 
energy security is going to become even less certain.  Germany is on course to 
reduce its own energy production, at the expense of satisfying the green 
coalition, while its growing economy will demand ever-increasing amounts of 
energy, which will have to be imported.  Regardless of the colossal efforts to 
increase efficiency, at some point it will become cost prohibitive to increase 
efficiency further.  This translates into the simple fact that Germany will 
eventually have to import more and more energy each year.  If trends continue, 
and there is little evidence to suggest otherwise, Germany will have to seek more 
energy from an increasingly aggressive and less friendly Russia.  That is unless 
something miraculously happens and Germany suddenly becomes more willing 
to seek alternative means of energy.  It will be costly, but in the end, it should 
provide them with much greater energy security.  This is exactly what Poland has 
attempted to do and can be seen in the following case study.  If not, then the only 
other option is for Germany to break with its greenhouse gas commitments and 




















Poland is in a completely different situation from Germany with regards to 
its energy security.  It was once a communist state and part of the Eastern Bloc.  
Yet Poland, despite its slowing economy over the past several years, remains 
one of the best examples of a country successfully transitioning from communism 
to democracy and a market based economy.  Poland’s crowning achievement 
came when it became a full-fledged member of the European Union in 2004.  
Poland is highly dependent upon trade with the rest of the EU and in particular 
Germany.  As of 2005, Poland’s Gross Domestic Product was 301.7 billion 
dollars, which was much greater than the other countries that entered the 
European Union at about the same time.  In fact, the combined GDPs of the 
Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungry in 2005 was only 278.6 billion, which was 
more than 22 billion less than Poland alone.  Yet, Poland still faces serious 
economic restructuring challenges.  Poland’s agricultural sector is antiquated and 
it needs to implement significant processes to increase energy efficiency 
throughout its entire industry sector in order to decrease energy consumption.   
Another difference between Germany and Poland is that the only real 
energy resource Poland has is coal, which accounts for most of its energy 
consumption.  However, like Germany, Poland has to “import most of its crude oil 
and natural gas requirements, which comes mainly from Russia.”111  Another 
hurdle for Poland is that it has had to make full-scale changes to its 
infrastructure, unlike its German counterparts.  In order to join the EU, Poland 
had to privatize its energy markets, but it was and still is against giving up 
complete control of its state energy companies.  The government’s fear is that 
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“not only could it compromise national energy security, but also increase 
Russian-based companies control through acquisition.”112 
 
B.   ENERGY SITUATION BY SECTOR 
Poland is the seventh largest consumer of energy in the European Union 
and while production was close to production in 2003, consumption has greatly 
outpaced production over the last four years.  As for oil, Poland has proven 
reserves of 96 million barrels of which it only produces about 33,500 barrels per 
day.  Yet, as can be see by Figure 9, Poland consumes over 400,000 barrels per 
day, which means it is heavily dependent upon imports.   
 
Figure 9.   Poland’s Oil Consumption113 
Fortunately, Poland has 350,000 bbl/d refining capacity, the largest in 
North Central Europe.  The primary means of oil imports come from Russia via 
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the Druzhba (Friendship) pipeline.  The pipeline originates in Russian and splits 
in Belarus into a northern and southern pipeline and it is the 1-million-bbl/d 
capacity northern branch, “which brings oil to Poland and Germany.  Poland also 
receives limited amounts of oil from the Naftoport terminal at Gdansk ”114 
In addition to oil, natural gas is also very limited in North Central  
Europe.  Poland has roughly 5.8 Tcf of natural gas reserves with the capability of 
producing only 200 BcF or about 40 percent of its domestic consumption, which 
is roughly 500 BcF.  Figure 10 shows this disparity with Poland indicated in blue. 
Figure 10.   Poland’s Natural Gas Consumption and Aggregate Production115 
The remaining natural gas comes predominately from Russia with a small 
portion coming from Germany and Norway.  Oddly, though, Poland is in a very 
interesting position when it comes to natural gas.  Poland owns about four 
percent of the primary pipelines, which run through Poland and supplies gas to 
not only Poland, but to the rest of Western Europe.  In addition, Poland has 
begun to invest in its own natural gas industry, which has actually resulted in a 
slight surplus of natural gas in the country.  With demand remaining relatively flat 
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over the past few years Poland has actually looked into the possibly of becoming  
a net natural gas distributor as well as looking into diversifying its natural gas 
suppliers.  This has other repercussions in the foreign policy arena, which will be 
discussed later.   
When looking at coal, Poland is also similar to Germany in that coal is its 
most abundant energy resource.  Poland has more than 15,000 million short tons 
(Mmst) in reserve accounting for more than 90 percent of its primary energy 
production and coal is one of the countries primary employers.  However, coal is 
environmentally unfriendly and there have been problems with the industry in 
general.  Also, in order to be accepted into the EU, Poland had to meet certain 
environmental standards that called for vast restructuring efforts on its part.  
Inefficiencies in the coal sector have “resulted in large annual loses, spurring the 
government to reform the sector.”116   
 
Figure 11.   Poland’s Coal Consumption and Aggregate Production117 
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The problem with this is that as the industry continues to transition, less 
coal will be produced.  This means other sources of energy will be required to fill 
the gap left by coal, increasing the reliance upon imports and Russia. 
The final energy sector for comparison involves nuclear power of which 
there is nothing to compare.  Poland currently has no nuclear power program and 
the government does not even foresee the feasibility of having a nuclear power 
program until after 2020.  The reasoning for this is that any attempt to 
commission a nuclear power plant would take at least ten years to build, plus an 
additional five years to campaign and gain public support for the plant before the 
first dollar was even invested into the project.  While nuclear power has not been 
ruled out permanently, the only reason Poland could possibly have for pursuing 
this route would be to diversify its primary energy sources in order to restrict 
greenhouse gasses and sulfur dioxide emissions.  Until then, Poland will be tied 
to both oil and gas from Russia, non-environmentally friendly coal, and 
renewable energy sources, but this sector is only a miniscule portion of its entire 
















































Poland 3.65 447 528 153 121 286
Czech 1.74 206 340 65 57 112
Slovak 0.8 71 246 10 25 38
Hungary 1.07 129 515 16 40 58
Total 7.26 853 1,629 244 243 494
Energy Consumption and Carbon Dioxide Emissions in North Central Europe
 
Table 2.   NCE Energy Consumption and Carbon Dioxide Emissions118  
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Tables 2 above and Table 3 below provides an excellent snapshot of the 
key energy supply indicators, energy consumption and carbon dioxide emission 











































Poland 96 5.82 15,432 37.2 200 177.8 141.3 467
Czech 15 0.14 6,120 15 5 70.4 78.2 198
Slovak 9 0.53 190 12.6 10 3.4 32.2 115
Hungary 102 1.21 3,700 45 100 14.5 29.7 161
Total 222 7.7 25,442 109.8 315 266.2 281.4 941
Energy Supply Indicators in North Central Europe
 
Table 3.   Energy Supply Indicators in NCE119 
 
C. THE ENERGY DEBATE 
Poland, like Germany, is in a position in which it needs to import large 
amounts of energy to cover its domestic consumption.  Poland only imports 
approximately 30 percent of all its energy needs from Russia, which is far less 
than that imported by Germany.  This means that Poland is in a better position, 
and less vulnerable, with regards to energy security than Germany and many of 
its neighboring states.  Ironically, Poland did not start out as being more energy 
independent and secure than other countries, but they ended up that way.  Many 
of Poland’s gains actually came as an unexpected benefit from cleaning up its 
energy sector, by switching from coal to natural gas as a main fossil fuel, a 
mandatory requirement before seeking EU membership.  Even though coal is 
more abundant and cheap, Poland has made vast strides to clean up its image 
as a heavy polluter.  The rest of Poland’s gains came from what could be 
considered as questionable and highly unorthodox leadership by the twin 
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Kaczynski brothers.  The brothers are both members of the socially conservative 
government and have repeatedly been accused of using aggression in domestic 
politics and of souring ties with Moscow and Brussels.  In fact, the brothers’ 
policies have tended to be so hostile to Russia that the only point they serves is 
to be disruptive toward any attempt by the EU to bring Russia closer to the 
continent no matter the issue; from WTO entry to securing energy supplies.  
Nevertheless, under the Kaczynskis’ direction, Poland has been forced to seek 
mini energy alliances and supplies from other more expensive suppliers.  
Consequently, Poland now has a supply system in place that is much more 
resistant to disruptions in the energy market by any one single supplier.  Much 
like a diversified money portfolio, Poland now has a diversified energy supply 
portfolio.   
The cost options facing Poland are very much like that of Germany, but 
reversed.  Poland can either continue to spend more for its energy from non- 
Russian suppliers or they can slowly work on their relationship with Russia to try 
and secure larger amounts of cheaper energy.  Poland even has the option in 
which they could be a primary leader in establishing several different suppliers 
into an integrated supply network.  Over time this could also lead to an integrated 
energy distribution network, but that would take some very serious commitments 
by all the parties involved and large amounts of capital, which means this idea is 
quite some time away, if even possible.  Unfortunately, Poland’s energy industry 
is a bit more inflexible than Germany’s in that it does not have nuclear power 
(even though Germany is removing their nuclear power plants).  The industry is 
also not as well developed and able to stave off unwanted Russian assertiveness 
like Germany.  Nevertheless, the strength of Poland’s energy industry lies in that 
it is already in compliance with the EU’s push to break up monopolistic national 
energy structures.  Since it does not have such structures, Poland can already be 
considered as unbundled.  In theory this is supposed to make it harder for non-
EU companies to buy energy supply and distribution business and is probably 
targeted at Gazprom whose actions toward Belarus and Ukraine have already 
 62
been discussed. This policy also allows for greater diversification of energy 
supplies by member states. As a result, Poland is in a very good position to 
reduce its dependence on Russian natural gas and oil.   
In the past Poland, like other countries to include Germany, has allowed 
the high costs associated with new energy politics to override the feelings it has 
for Russia and its cheaper energy, but that is changing.  Poland’s state owned 
gas monopoly PGNiG is in the process of purchasing a 15 percent stake in 
ExxonMobii’s Skarv and Snadd fields off the coast of Norway, which are 
estimated to hold upward of 36 billion cubic meters of natural gas.  This deal also 
partners Poland with BP, Royal Dutch/Shell, Norway’s Statoil and Nordk Hydro 
some of the world’s leaders in natural gas exploration and production.  The 
expertise gained from working with these giants could easily transition into 
furthering development and production within Poland itself.  Poland is also 
looking into building a pipeline with the Norwegians from the coast of Norway 
through Denmark and ending in Poland.  One of the primary benefits of this plan 
it that there is already a vast infrastructure from Norway to Denmark in place, so 
the only real costs would be in building the lines into Poland.  This is highly 
supported and an exceptional deal for Norway, which has been looking into and 
has considerable potential for expanding supplies to Europe.  In fact, Norway is 
“the world’s third largest exporter of oil and gas, with less than one third of its 
total expected petroleum resources used up.”120  This partnership would be of 
exceptional value to Poland because it could gain invaluable expertise in the field 
of building undersea pipelines, which Poland lacks but the Norwegians do not.  
Finally, Poland is working on additional plans with France to help build a liquefied 
natural gas terminal in Gdansk.  This project would cost “a whopping $4 billion to 
$5 billion – but once completed would allow Poland to secure supplies from 
almost any foreign (non-Russian) supplier in the world.”121   
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Poland is also in a position to seek the support of and lead other 
European nations into becoming significant energy partners.  With Poland 
leading the discussions, five countries agreed on a pipeline to bypass Russia. On 
October 10, 2007, Ukraine, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Lithuania, and Poland all 
agreed on a deal for “construction of an oil pipeline linking the Black and Baltic 
seas – a project aimed at improving regional energy security and reducing 
dependence on Russian crude oil.”122      
 
Figure 12.   Five Country Pipeline to Bypass Russia123 
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The pipeline deal involves building a 500-kilometer extension to the current 
pipeline located in western Ukraine northward to link up with Gdansk on the 
Baltic Sea, while securing crude from Azerbaijan and the Caspian Sea.  The 
route of the pipeline extension, is highlighted with a circle, is shown in Figure 12 
above.  The deal is expected to cost approximately $700 million and begin 
operations sometime in 2011.  The hope is that the pipeline will provide some 
predictability and stability to oil supplies in a region that has traditionally only 
know instability. 
In reflection, it would be very difficult to deny that Poland’s actions have 
placed it in a very interesting position with regards to the rest of Europe, 
especially when dealing with energy problems.  From a trade aspect, Poland is in 
an ideal location/position to be a key distributor of energy throughout the 
European Union.  Even though Poland does not have large supplies of oil and 
gas it has been entering into agreements that could place it at the center of an 
ever-increasing energy transit and distribution business for the continent.  Poland 
is not as entrenched with its traditional ways of doing things as the older 
members of the EU (France, Great Britain, and Germany to name a few) and is 
probably its greatest advantage.  Poland has been successful enough to the 
point that they can be looked upon as a role model for other Eastern European 
countries still seeking EU membership.   Poland’s energy industry while not as 
advanced as its western counterparts still provides the government enough 
flexibility to seek out new, non-Russian solutions to its inadequate energy 
supplies.  As long as market forces remain consistent, Poland should continue to 
have better leverage over the energy market than other nations.  Norway, 
France, the group of five (the five countries seeking ways around Russia) and 
others will always be open to deals that could potentially increase their market 
share as well as diversify customers and ensure stability.  Poland is ideally 
placed to help provide Europe with what it needs most – leadership in 
establishing more secure energy supplies at a time when Russia is regarded as 
becoming increasingly belligerent.    
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 D. ENERGY POLICY 
Historically, relations between Russia and Poland have never been cordial 
and have at times been extremely hostile dating back to the Second World War 
and even further.  Yet, the cool relations between Russia and Poland have 
significantly deteriorated since the presidential and parliamentary elections of 
2005, when the twin Kaczynski brothers came into power.  President Lech 
Kaczynski and Prime Minster Jaroslaw Kaczynski deeply nationalistic policies 
have been an area of concern domestically, politically, and economically.  Their 
policies have also been seen in Poland’s foreign relations as well.  “Relations 
with some neighboring states and the European Union have been strained at 
times, but ties with the United States have not undergone significant change.”124    
In addition to the EU, Poland’s relationship with Russia has also been strained to 
say the least.   
General attitudes toward the Russians are negative at best, and the recent 
trend is for Poland to confront Russia whenever it is in Poland’s best interest 
rather than to appease Russia.  For example:  
The twins led a witch hunt to root out any communists and their 
sympathizers, replaced much of the cabinet, scrapped the Soviet-
era intelligence community and began negotiations with the United 
States over a missile defense base in Poland.125   
As a response, Russia erected trade barriers against Polish agricultural products.  
Consequently, Poland continues to derail any hopes the EU has of establishing 
better relations with Russia by vetoing any and all potential agreements between 
the two.  The actions on both sides eventually pushed Russia into using energy 
as a political weapon.  The final straw came in the not so direct threat posed from 
Russia seeking to build a natural gas pipeline, Nord Stream, through the Baltic 
Sea to Germany, which will completely bypass Poland.  This pipeline has caused 
                                            
124 Carl Ek, “Poland: Background and Policy Trends of the Kaczynski Government,” (CRS 
Report for Congress, August 2, 2006), 1. 
125 Stratfor, “Poland.” 
 66
significant angst in and has been vehemently opposed by Poland ever since its 
first inception.   This pipeline deal is a prime example of the type of power politics 
Russia has resorted to quite recently.  Russia has turned off the supply of gas to 
both Ukraine and Belarus, supposedly their two closest and friendliest neighbors 
over price disputes and other political agenda.  Even though Poland has not 
been threatened directly, it is not out of the realm of possibly that once the direct 
pipeline to Germany has been established, gas could be withheld and politically 
used against them.  “Russia has been able to maintain the upper hand in the 
feud because it controls such a large portion of Poland’s energy supplies,”126 and 
without diversification Poland has few alternatives but to adhere to Russia’s 
demands. 
 Despite the openly hostile attitude of the twin brothers and all of the 
theatrics involved, Poland has actually been able to establish guidelines for a 
national energy strategy and policy.  Guidelines for Poland’s energy policy are 
envisioned to guide and direct state activities up to the year 2020.  The plan is 
basically two-fold; the first aspect is to diversify sources of supply (other than 
Russia) that has been previously and thoroughly discussed.  The other aspect of 
Poland’s energy policy is a 
Strategy based on an Improvement in energy efficiency, whose 
central element includes a promotion of modern, highly efficient 
power machines and equipment capable for competition both in 
national and foreign markets.  The rationalization policy consists of: 
improvement of fuel consumption efficiency, rational heat and 
electricity consumption, and the promotion of non-conventional and 
renewable energy sources.127   
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As opposed to Germany, Poland’s energy industry is relatively inefficient and has 
more to gain from promoting energy efficiency.  Through direct regulations, 
market stimulation, and better education, any money spent will see much greater 
return per dollar than in Germany.  This leads the discussion back to which of the 
aforementioned approaches Poland is most likely to pursue.   
 Needless-to-say, Poland is not interested in any approach that would 
establish additional or even further ties to Russia; thus, Russia’s preferred 
method of seeking bilateral agreements is not feasible.  The Nord Stream 
pipeline and Russia’s actions to Poland’s neighbors to the east have soured any 
potential solutions for the immediate future.  Poland repeatedly argues that “there 
is no economic justification for the NEGP (Nord Stream Pipeline) and it is in line 
with the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact between Hitler and Stalin.”128  Although the 
pipeline is not an overtly hostile act, like the pact that triggered the Second World 
War, it does make Poland very nervous and reluctant to enter into any 
agreement with either country.  Unfortunately, Poland’s memories of the 
devastation brought on by both countries during the war will take a very long time 
to forget.  
 As for the other two approaches, the EU centric and U.S. led, Poland is in 
a position to be able to choose either path.  Deep down, The Kaczynski 
government desperately wants a stronger EU and could be in favor and 
supportive of the EU centric approach.  All of Poland’s energy deals and plans 
with other EU and non-EU countries over the past few years would definitely 
confirm this suggestion.  Additionally, Poland has had to drastically reform major 
sectors and industries just to gain acceptance in the EU, as was previously 
discussed in prior sections.  Also, a country would not go through all of the 
relative pain and effort if it were not interested in the overall ideals of the union in 
the first place.  The only problem with the EU centric approach is the EU is 
insistent on maintaining very strong energy ties to Russia and even seeking 
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additional supplies and contracts with Russia in the short-term.  Even though the 
EU’s plan is to reduce dependence on Russia later on, Poland is adamant about 
lessening Russian dependence now and is not willing to listen or compromise if 
increasing Russian supplies is even suggested.  The reason for this is the Polish 
government has been somewhat “skeptical of the EU.  (In terms of Russia, 
Poland) favors eventual widening (to include Ukraine and Belarus) but not 
necessarily the deepening of the Union.”129  This has been more than apparent 
in the number of vetoes Poland has issued in EU meetings concerning Russia as 
well as Russia’s potential entry into the WTO and the agricultural dispute with 
Russia, all of which has also previously been discussed in depth.  The skepticism 
is further justified because some EU governments also believe that close 
cooperation with Russia in energy commerce will not lead to energy security, but 
then these countries are the same ones that can’t or won’t come to agreement on 
a EU energy treaty or policy.   In short, Poland is more than willing to support the 
EU so long as it does not increase dependence on Russia.  Maintaining current 
supplies from Russia are acceptable so long as there is a plan to reduce 
dependence on Russia later.  This reduced dependence is also a key part of the 
U.S. led approach, which is most likely why it could also be argued that Poland 
prefers this concept as well. 
 Despite all of the misgivings of the U.S. led approach by Russia, 
Germany, and perhaps even the majority of the EU, it does have some merits for 
Poland.  First and foremost, Poland and the United States have historically close 
relations while relations with Germany and Russia have been strained. The 
United States was the predominant supporter of and probably was the primary 
reason Poland was even accepted into NATO, which eventually led to and made 
entry into the EU possible.  “Poland has cooperated with the United States on 
such issues as democratization, nuclear proliferation, human rights, regional 
cooperation, and UN reform.”130  Poland has even been one of the United States 
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primary supporters in the global war on terrorism and has contributed troops to 
not only Afghanistan, but also Iraq.  In return, the United States has been an ally 
of and staunch supporter for bolstering Poland’s security, which has led to the 
controversial U.S. plan to deploy Patriot missile batteries inside Poland.  The 
whole Patriot missile issue could take volumes to discuss, but the issue validates 
Poland’s concern with regards to its energy security.  Poland does not trust 
Russia to provide energy on a consistent basis or without political attachments.  
At the same time, Poland may be a part of the EU, but it does not feel that the 
EU is willing to provide it adequate security if Russia were to become hostile.  
Nevertheless, the issues of U.S./NATO, missiles, and even pipelines are political 
hot potatoes.  The only thing that is certain is that 
There is division in the EU over management of the Union’s 
growing dependence on Russian oil and gas.  Several states, led 
by Poland, wish to engage NATO more fully in ensuring energy 
security in this relationship.  While in the early stages of discussion, 
Poland is exploring a role for NATO and the United States, perhaps 
only diplomatically, in which U.S. leverage on Moscow could be an 
element for encouraging responsible Russian behavior and 
deflecting any Russian attempt to divide the Europeans.131 
Poland argues its actions are not aimed at any one country (implying Russia).  
Russia on the other hand would argue that it is just another attempt by Poland to 
further isolate Europe from Russia, only proving that it is Europe and not Russia 
that is using energy as a political weapon.    As for now, it is difficult to determine 
which approach Poland will ultimately choose, but it will remain consistent it its 
desire to reduce dependency upon Russia as a primary supplier of energy. 
 
E. POLAND’S ROAD AHEAD 
The phrase “Everything changes with time” is quite prophetic when one 
considers that Poland’s recent elections will most likely change Poland’s position 
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on energy security in Europe.  The only thing that has been consistent is that 
Poland’s energy policy as well as domestic and foreign policies have been quite 
inconsistent over the past several years.  Since 2001, five different people have 
held the position of prime minister.  Controversy and scandal have been the only 
consistent factors associated with the position, and last prime minister was no 
different.  Much of Poland’s energy policy success can actually be attributed to 
what could be called very unconventional leadership from its President and 
Prime Minister, twin brothers, Aleksander and Jaroslaw Kwasniewski.  Ironically, 
the full effects of the twin’s plans will never be fully realized due to the 
unexpected defeat of the incumbent Prime Minister (Jaroslaw Kaczynski) of the 
Law and Justice party by Donald Tusk of the Civic Platform party during elections 
on October 21, 2007.  This newly elected and yet to be formed coalition 
government will most likely have a significant impact, but until the new 
government comes into power on November 5, 2007 it is impossible to analyze 
what could be, versus what is currently happening, and then it will still take time 
to fully determine the impact.  Nevertheless, there are some certainties that can 
be foreseen, which will have significant impact on Poland’s energy situation.   
Before the election, it would have been very easy to suggest that Poland 
would most likely pursue the U.S. led option.  However, things have changed and 
Tusk's Civic Platform party is first-and-foremost a pro-European Union, pro-
business and socially conservative minded party.  Additionally, the first thing 
Tusk did was to open talks with the Polish Peasants’ Party, a small but influential 
EU-friendly party, currently in government, in an attempt to lay the initial 
foundations for a coalition government.  With this in mind, there is little to suggest 
that Tusk would be willing to pursue the U.S. led option over the EU-centric plan.  
Tusk campaigned on promises to “build a more harmonious relationship with the 
EU and to pursue the economic opportunities presented by membership in the 
bloc,”132 which Poland joined in 2004.  Tusk also has plans to visit Brussels with 
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other EU members, which the current government has not done in the past two 
years.  This stance suggests that Poland will most likely “unblock” issues with the 
rest of the EU, which the Kaczynski brothers have blocked.  Additionally, Tusk 
has also called for a renewed look at some of the policies of Poland’s closest 
ally...the United States.  This suggests that Poland could withdraw what many 
consider as too much support for the United States with too little return.   
Poland is definitely at a crossroads with regards to how it will plan for its 
future energy security.  Unfortunately, the recent elections only made matters 
more complicated. The Civic Platform party wants the provisions of the EU 
Energy Charter to be binding for Poland.  However, President Kaczynski is still in 
power and could be a significant roadblock to this and any other polies so long as 
he remains in power.  The only thing that can be counted on is despite which 
direction Poland takes, Russia is not the solution and Poland will continue on any 
and all paths which supplies additonal non-Russian energy.  
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The latter part of 2007 shows a world with record high oil prices nearing 
$100 a barrel, a resurgent and potentially economically viable Russia on the 
verge of becoming the world’s premier energy supplier, and an ever-increasingly 
energy dependent Europe.  Many of Europe’s energy intensive sectors have 
shrunk while less intensive industries and services have emerged, but it is not 
enough.  Europe/EU remains the world’s largest energy importer and its second 
largest consumer.  Despite all of the research into and efforts to establish energy 
policies, there is still confusion between energy dependence and the issue of 
energy security.  The reality remains that trading between “Russia and Europe is 
determined by market principles and a need for stable, long-term contractual 
arrangements based on credible commitments.”133  In an increasingly 
interdependent word, “energy security will depend much on how countries 
manage their relations with one another, whether bilaterally or within multilateral 
frameworks.”134  In the end, even though politics should not matter, unfortunately 
they do. Russia, Germany, Poland, and the rest of Europe all use politics, which 
ultimately prevents real energy security from becoming a reality. 
Many could argue that attitudes toward Russia and its energy policy are 
too harsh and one sided.  However, Russia’s behavior has remained consistent 
in other areas as well.  The problem between Russia and the EU countries are 
much broader then energy.  Russia uses other trade and economic relations “as 
political levers or as a means of reasserting power.  It is all the rage for Moscow 
and it has alienated more than one EU member.”135  Since July of 2006, 
Lithuania has had to have its oil shipped in from Russia at a much higher cost 
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than it used to get through the Druzhba pipeline.  The reason for this is that a 
portion of the pipeline accidentally, and conveniently to some, ruptured during a 
dispute between the two countries.  Russia has repeatedly attempted to take 
over Lithuania’s Mazeikie Nafta refinery, which it wants to sell to anyone but 
Russia, therefore Russia has refused to fix the 324,000 barrels per day pipeline.  
Russia is also bullying Finland and Sweden.  “Russia sees Finnish and Swedish 
paper and pulp processing industries as the largest rivals to its own aspirations to 
expand its timber industry domestically.”136  Consequently, Russia raised tariffs 
on timber exports, from $7 per cubic meter to $75, a move that will probably 
close many of the plants in both Finland and Sweden.  Finally, even though 
Germany has strengthened energy ties to Russia, Russia is not satisfied.  Russia 
demanded that Germany move “Lufthansa’s air-freight hub to Southeast Asia 
from Kazakhstan to Russia.”137  When Lufthansa refused, their flights were 
banned from Moscow and resulted in Germany doing the same to Aeroflot’s 
cargo flights.  Unfortunately, Germany backed down and conceded to Russia’s 
demands after Russia called Germany’s actions blackmail.  Even though Russia 
never publicly threatened to turn off energy supplies to Germany over the issue, 
in my opinion it had to have been a factor in Germany’s capitulation.  Russia’s 
actions are not that of a reliable supplier, in fact they are borderline child-like. 
Nevertheless, the final analysis of Germany and Poland, unequivocally 
and clearly shows that Europe has to establish a common energy policy.  There 
are too many variables that can cause significant problems if Russia is permitted 
to deal with them individually. 
Energy security requires a larger perspective.  Whatever may be 
said about energy independence, the truth is that there is only one 
global oil market (as well as gas and other energy resources).  
Moreover, energy markets like the rest of trade and finance, are 
ever more internationally entwined.  Energy security does not 
reside in a realm of its own, but is part of the larger pattern of 
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relations among nations.  How those relations go will do much to 
determine how secure we are when it comes to energy.138 
Russia has proven time and again it cannot be trusted to provide energy on a 
consistent basis.  Russia has also proved that it is more than willing to dictate 
terms and to use energy as a political weapon as a tool for negotiations during 
disputes or conflicts.  Apparently, the disputes between Ukraine and Russia, and 
even Belarus and Russia, have been forgotten.  Despite Russia’s past history 
and the latest event between Russia and Germany this past August, the 
Europeans don’t seem too concerned with allying themselves with Russia.  
Ironically, the volatility of the global energy market has prompted closer 
cooperation with Russia.  The Commission of European Communities issued a 
Green Paper last year to address its energy security challenges and 
opportunities.  One section of the paper specifically addressed “efforts to 
establish and strengthen energy partnerships with Russia.”139  It will definitely be 
interesting to see how the latest issue between Germany and Russia influences 
European policy; although, for the time being there does not seem to be any 
planned changes.  Another area of interest, and one that was only mentioned 
due to lack of data is the Arctic seabed.  It will be extremely interesting to see 
how this region will impact the energy market in years to come and is a topic 
worthy of exploration at a later date.   
The real problem is that it is unclear whether the EU could have played a 
role in managing any of the crises mentioned or could play a role in the future.  
Without a common policy it is almost a forgone conclusion that the answer 
should be no, but there is some hope on the horizon.  There has been progress 
in establishing some guidelines, but the latest directives on security of supply in 
2004, “is a relatively week instrument leaving most of the responsibilities with 
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national authorities.”140    This forces national authorities to rectify any dispute 
with Russia on an individual basis, but unfortunately places too much power and 
control of the energy market in Russian hands.   Even though this situation is 
less than ideal it is of greater concern to many of the newer EU states that are 
more susceptible to disruptions in their energy supplies.  The larger and older 
states are less vulnerable because they have large trans-European companies 
that currently dominate European markets and can provide a counterbalance to 
Russian companies. 
Yet the Europeans have to be very careful.  The EU is expected to present 
detailed proposals, in its Brussels Plan, for an overhaul of its current energy 
market regulations by the end of September 2007 and the proposals are 
considered by some countries to be very radical.  The concern lies in that the 
smaller nations are fearful the larger energy corporations will drive out their 
smaller competitors and reduce competition, a situation that could be solved if 
the larger companies were unbundled.  In an attempt to invoke more dynamism 
into the market, the EU energy commissioner “is expected to suggest that 
member states break up the integrated energy groups, forcing them to sell their 
electricity grids and pipeline networks.”141  Conversely, many of the older and 
larger states, like France, are directly at odds with the Brussels Plan.   
France remains implacably opposed to any proposal for 
unbundling.  It is an ideological view.  We have a strategic view.  It 
is a better balance between European interests and competition 
rules.142   
Further arguments state that bundled companies ensure lower prices and better 
security of supply.  This only confuses the situation even more which means the 
chances of developing a common energy policy in the short term is very unlikely.   
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This only leaves one real, but very expensive, option left to Europe if they 
truly desire energy security and independence.  Europe needs to follow Poland’s 
example and seek out other suppliers of energy in addition to Russia.  Germany 
is sort of proceeding down this line of thought with the plan to build a North Sea 
pipeline with Russia, but not really.   Germany is only spending large amounts of 
money on this new pipeline, in order to garner more supplies of energy from 
Russia.  The bottom line is that this approach is cheaper then seeking out new 
sources of reserves or partners.  However, this new pipeline will still not solve the 
problem.  Russia has a limited amount of oil and natural gas it can produce each 
year and it is unwilling to allow direct foreign investment into its energy industry 
to help develop infrastructure as well as explore for new untapped reserves.   
Also, Russia can only use energy as a political tool as long as there is a limited 
supply.  Therefore, it is not in Russia’s interest to change its policies nor does it 
look like a change is in store for the immediate future.   
Again, the solution lies with Poland’s example.  It should come as no 
surprise that Poland is simply following the Russian’s way of doing business after 
all.  “Though they would never admit to it, Poland is taking a page from the 
Russian manual in valuing political strategy far above economic practicality.”143  
Even though it would be less expensive to continue receiving energy from 
Russia, Poland feels that the financial burden associated with new projects are 
worth the risk.  If Europe chose the Polish route, it would also need to develop 
additional pipelines and infrastructure to support the exchange of supplies 
between members if there is a disruption in supply to any country.  Even though 
this would generate even greater costs, it could provide the basis for an energy 
grid similar to the one found in the United States.  The problem is how to 
transport gas, oil, and electricity efficiently across Europe given its varied and 
dispersed markets.     
The engineering challenge is far more tractable than big 
companies’ collective will to undertake it.  Interconnections between 
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national electricity grids do not have enough capacity to allow 
prices to equalize across the continent.  The EU has prescribed 
that interconnections should be able to carry at least 10% of 
national consumption, but few states have that great a capacity.144 
Though difficult, it is not impossible and a solution to do it must be found 
and then the work must actually be accomplished.  Only when Europe can 
establish a transportation and electrical grid capable of diverting power 
and supplies to those who need it most, will it truly take the first real steps 
toward energy independence and security. 
  Germany, Poland, and Russia, not to forget the rest of Europe and for that 
matter the world, is in the middle of what could become the next serious conflict 
in the 21st century; the battle for resources and energy security.  Russia, which 
has energy security in both supply and demand, has often and quite recently 
shown its willingness to use energy as a political weapon.  Since Europe is not 
likely to come together and establish a common energy policy, it must work 
together to at least establish alternative sources of energy or they will become 
Russian puppets with pipelines as strings.  Also, as long as nuclear power and 
coal remain environmental “hot potatoes” and renewable sources remain under-
developed the only real resources left are oil and gas.  Without diversification on 
both sides of the supply and demand curves, the most powerful of countries can 
quickly become vulnerable to those who do.  To quote Daniel Yergin, one last 
time, “Diversification will remain the fundamental starting principle of energy 
security.”145  Consequently, it is not hard to answer the original question of this 
thesis.  In my opinion, even though the economics have yet to prove it, Germany, 
Poland, and the rest of Europe cannot have true energy security as long as 
Russia is the predominant supplier.  However, Russia still needs to be a part of 
the equation, just not the limiting factor of the equation. 
 
                                            
144 The Economist. 
145 Yergin, “Ensuring Energy Security.” 
 79
LIST OF REFERENCES 
Bahgat, Gawdat, “Europe’s Energy Security: Challenges and Opportunities,” 
International Affairs, London, Sep 2006, vol. 82, Iss 5. 
Bounds, Andrew, Toblas Buck and Sarah Laitner, “French Energy Deal a Vision 
for EU,” Financial Times, September 8, 2007. 
Buckley, Neil, “Putin considers creation of ‘gas Opec’ but denies plans for cartel,” 
Financial Times, February 2, 2007. 
Buckley, Neil, Daniel Dombey, and Carola Hoyos, “NATO fears Russian plans for 
‘gas OPEC’ *Energy tensions deepen between Kremlin and EU,” Financial 
Times, November 14, 2006, 
http://proquest.umi.com.libproxy.mps.navy.mil/ (accessed January 23, 
2007). 
Choen, Ariel, “The North European Gas Pipeline Threatens Europe’s Energy 
Security,” Backgrounder, The Heritage Foundation, no. 1980, October 26, 
2006, http://www.heritage.org/Research/Europe/bg1980.cfm (accessed 
October 20, 2007). 
Crooks, Ed, “Drip feed: Why high oil prices threaten to linger,” Financial Times, 
July 19, 2007. 
Deese, David A., “Energy: Economics, Politics, and Security,” International 
Security, Vol. 4, No. 3 (Winter, 1979-1980). 
Dempsey, Judy, “Merkel Confronts German Energy Industry with Radical Policy 
Overhaul,” International Herald Tribune, July 4, 2007, 
http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/07/03/business/nuke.php (accessed 
September 3, 2007). 
The Economist, “Special Report: The politics of power – European energy 
markets,” London, February 11, 2006, Vol. 378, Iss. 8464, 75 (accessed 
via ProQuest March 19, 2007). 
Ek, Carl, “Poland: Background and Policy Trends of the Kaczynski Government,” 
CRS Report for Congress, August 2, 2006. 
 80
Energy Charter, “About the Charter,” www.encharter.org (accessed March 20, 
2007). 
Energy Charter, “Trade and Transit,” www.encharter.org (accessed March 20, 
2007). 
Energy Information Administration, “German Energy Data, Statistics and Analysis 
– Oil, Gas, Electricity, Coal: Country Analysis Briefs,” 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Germany/Background.html (accessed 
August 30, 2007). 
Energy Information Administration, “European Union: Country Analysis Briefs,” 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/European_Union/Energy.html 
(accessed October 5, 2007). 
Energy Information Administration, “North-Central Europe: Country Analysis 
Briefs,” 1, http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/NC_Europe/Full.html 
(accessed September 6, 2007). 
Energy Information Administration, “Russia: Country Analysis Briefs,” 1, 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/Russia/Full.html (accessed September 28, 
2007). 
EIU ViewsWire, “EU Economy: Energy relations with Russia,” New York: October 
18, 2006. 
Financial Times, “Energy giants do not mean energy security Europe has better 
ways to ensure gas and electricity supplies,” January 13, 2007. 
Finon, Dominique and Catherine Locatelli, “Russian and European gas 
interdependence: Can market forces balance out geopolitics?”  Cahier de 
Recherché Lepii, Serie EPE, No 41 bis, January 2007. 
Gallis, Paul, “NATO and Energy Security,” CRS Report for Congress,” Order 
Code RS22409, March 21, 2006. 
Gelb, Bernard A., “Russian Natural Gas: Regional Dependence,” CRS Report for 
Congress, January 10, 2007. 
Glover, Carol and Carl E. Behrens, “Energy: Selected Facts and Numbers,” CRS 
Report for Congress, July 24, 2007. 
 81
Gorst, Isabel, “Russia raises stakes over Artic seabed,” Financial Times, August 
2, 2007. 
Gorst, Isabel, “Russian threat to cut Belarus gas supply in pursuit of $450 debt: 
Move could hurt European customers,” Financial Times, August 2, 2007. 
Hoffman, David E., The Oligarchs: Wealth and Power in the New Russia, Public 
Affairs, New York, 2002. 
Ibison, David, “Oslo’s Artic arc could yield a European gas champion,” Financial 
Times, February 6, 2007. 
Johnson, Deborah, EU-Russian Energy Links: A Marriage of Convenience?” 
Government and Opposition, London: March 2005. Vol 40, Iss. 2; 256, 
http://proquest.umi.com.libproxy.mps.navy.mil/ (accessed January 23, 
2007). 
Mongoven, Bart and Davis Cherry, “Germany and China: In Search of Energy 
Certainty,” Stratfor, January 25, 2007. 
Munchau, Wolfgang, “Europe needs a joint response to Russia,” Financial Times, 
London, 17, May 8, 2006. 
Olearchyk, Roman and Catherine Belton, “Gazprom puts on display of political 
muscle,” Financial Times, October 3, 2007. 
Olearchyk, Roman and Neil Buckley, “Ukraine repays Gazprom debt in cash and 
gas,” Financial Times, October 10, 2007. 
OxResearch, “CEE: Diversifying Energy Away From Russia Has Costs,” Oxford, 
February 13, 2006, 1 (accessed via ProQuest, March 19, 2007). 
OxResearch, “European Union: EU to Address Security of Gas Supply,” Oxford, 
January 6, 2006. 
OxResearch, “Germany/Russia: Merkel sets new tone in Relations,” Oxford, 
January 19, 2006, 1 (accessed via ProQuest February 1, 2007). 
OxResearch, “Russia/Germany: Relations to focus on economics,” Oxford, 
October 10, 2003, 1 (accessed via ProQuest March 19, 2007). 
 82
OxResearch,  “Russia/U.S./EU: Security thinking fuels energy dilemma,” Oxford: 
September 21, 2006, http://proquest.umi.com.libproxy.mps.navy.mil/ 
(accessed January 23, 2007). 
Petroleum Economist, “Dealing with the neighbors,” London, November 2006, 
(accessed via ProQuest February 1, 2007). 
Quayat, David, “The Russian Oil Sector and the Global Oil Economy: A 
Prospectus,” SAIS Review, 23.2, 2003, 
http://proquest.umi.com.libproxy.mps.navy.mil/ (accessed January 24, 
2007). 
Peel, Quentin, “Russia’s politics are wedded to its business,” Financial Times, 
October 4, 2007. 
Rachman, Gideon, “The world has two energy crises but no real answers,” 
Financial Times, July 10, 2007. 
Radio Free Europe, “Five Countries Agree on Pipeline to Bypass Russia,” 
RFE/RL Newsline Vol. 11, No. 188, Part I, October 11, 2007. 
Radio Free Europe, “Russia Reduces Oil Exports to Germany,” RFE/RL 
Newsline Vol. 11, No. 158, Part I, August 27, 2007. 
Reuters, “Russian coal mine blast toll rises to 105,” MSNBC, March 20, 2007, 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/17687093/ (accessed March 22, 2007). 
Sapir, Jacques, “Energy Security in Russia: The case for Energy Efficiency” 
(Unpublished manuscript, EHESS-Paris). 
Shlapentokh, Vladimir, “”Intoxicated by high oil prices: Political Dutch disease 
afflicting the Kremlin,” Oil & Gas Journal, 104, 41, November 6, 2006. 
Stephens, Philip, “The west pays a heavy price for foreign policy realism,” 
Financial Times, London, October 14, 2005, 
http://proquest.umi.com.libproxy.mps.navy.mil/ (accessed January 23, 
2007). 
Stratfor, “Global Market Brief: Russia’s Tattered Ties to the EU,” November 15, 
2007, www.stratfor.com (accessed November 15, 2007). 
 83
Stratfor, “Poland: Putting Politics and Security Before Economics,” March 2, 
2007, http://www.stratfor.com/products/premium/print.php?storyld=285134  
(accessed March 2, 2007). 
Stulberg, Adam N., Well-Oiled Diplomacy: Strategic Manipulation and Russia’s 
Energy Statecraft in Eurasia, Albany, NY: State University of New York 
Press, 2007. 
Tigner, Brooks, “Allies Struggle to Define Energy Security,” Defense News, 
March 5, 2007. 
Yergin, Daniel, “What Does Energy Security Really Mean,” Wall Street Journal, 
New York, N.Y., July 11, 2006. 
Yergin, Daniel, “Ensuring Energy Security,” Foreign Affairs, New York, 
March/April 2006, Vol. 85, Iss 2. 
Zhukov, Yuri M., “Eurasia Insight: Addressing Pipeline Security Challenges in 
Russia,” Eurasianet.org,” December 7, 2006, 
www.eruasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav120706a_pr.shtml 




























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 85
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
Fort Belvoir, Virginia 
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 
 
 
 
 
 
